# Butler 1AC

## FW

#### Educational spaces like debate are not neutral – they can either be unique sites for creating change or can reproduce settler colonialism. The way we engage in pedagogy influences whether we reproduce domination or develop a critical consciousness. To create an emancipatory educational space, we must develop a critical consciousness against colonialism. Thus, the role of the ballot is to engage in Red Pedagogy, and affirm the best methodology for deconstructing settler colonialism.

Grande 04**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

As we raise yet another generation in a nation at war, **it is** even more **imperative for schools to be reimagined as sites for social transformation and emancipation**; as **a place** "**where students** are educated not only to be critical thinkers, but also to **view the world as a place where their actions might make a difference**" (McLaren 2003). More specifically, McLaren outlines the es- sential elements of a post-9/11 critical pedagogy: (1) to support the broader societal aim of freedom of speech; (2) to be willing to challenge the Bush ad- ministration's definition of "patriotism"; (3) to examine the linkages between government and transnational corporations; (4) to commit to critical self- reflexivity and dialogue in public conversations; (5) to enforce the separation between church and state; (6) to struggle for a media that does not serve cor- porate interests; and, above all, (7) to commit to understanding the funda- mental basis of Marx's critique of capitalism (McLaren 2003) Indeed, in a time when the forces of free-market politics conspire not only to maintain the march of colonialism but also to dismantle (i.e., privatize) public education, such aims are essential. In addition to these immediate concerns, the frameworks of revolutionary critical theory provide indigenous educators and scholars a way to think about the issues of sovereignty and self-determination that moves beyond simple cultural constructions and analyses. Specifically, their foregrounding of cap- italist relations as the axis of exploitation helps to frame the history of in- digenous peoples as one of dispossession and not simply oppression. Their trenchant critique of postmodernism helps to reveal the "problem" of identity (social representation) as a distraction from the need for social transforma- tion. Similarly, the work of revolutionary critical feminists helps to explain how gendered differences have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation. In all these ways, the analyses of rev- olutionary critical pedagogy prove invaluable. As discussed in previous chapters, however, there are also ways in which the analysis of revolutionary theorists fails to consider their own enmesh- ment with the Western paradigm. Specifically, the notion of "democratiza- tion" remains rooted in Western concepts of property; the radical constructs of identity remain tied to Western notions of citizenship; the analyses of Marxist-feminists retain Western notions of subjectivity and gender; and revolutionary conceptions of the "ecological crisis" presume the "finished project" of colonization. Such aporias of revolutionary critical pedagogy, however, must not be viewed as deficiencies. Rather, they should be theorized as points of tension, helping to define the spaces in-between the Western and indigenous thought-worlds. Rev- olutionary scholars themselves acknowledge "no theory can fully anticipate or account for the consequences of its application but remains a living aperture through which specific histories are made visible and. intelligible" (McLaren and Farahmandpur 2001, 301). In other words no theory can, or should be, every- thing to all peoples—difference in the material domain necessitates difference in discursive fields. Therefore, while revolutionary critical theory can serve as a vi- tal tool for indigenous educators and scholars, **the basis of Red pedagogy [is] re- mains distinctive, rooted in indigenous knowledge and praxis**. Though a "tradition-based" revitalization project, **Red pedagogy does not aim to reproduce an essentialist** or romanticized **view of "tradition**." As sev- eral indigenous scholars have noted (e.g., Alfred, Deloria, Mihesuah, Warrior) the "return to tradition" is often a specious enterprise. In contradistinction to essentialist models of "tradition," Taiaiake Alfred suggests a model of "self- conscious traditionalism" for indigenous communities. He defines "self- conscious traditionalism" as an intellectual, social, and political movement to reinvigorate indigenous values, principles, and other cultural elements best suited to the larger contemporary political and economic reality (Alfred 1999, 81). In this context, tradition is not simply "predicated upon a set of uniform, unchanging beliefs" but rather is expressed as a *commitment* to the future sus- tainability of the group (Warrior 1995, xx). In other words, the struggle for freedom is not about "dressing up in the trappings of the past and making de- mands" but about being firmly rooted in "the ever changing experiences of the community." As such, **the process of defining a Red pedagogy is** neces- sarily **ongoing and self-reflexive**— a never-ending project that is continually informed by the work of critical and indigenous scholars and by the changing realities of indigenous peoples. Though the process is continual, **the overarching goal** of Red pedagogy **is** stable. It is, and will always remain, **decolonization**. "**Decolonization**" (like democracy) **is** neither achievable nor definable, rendering it ephemeral as a goal, but **perpetual as a process**. That is not to say, however, that "progress" cannot be measured. Indeed, **the degree to which indigenous peoples are able to define and exercise political, intellectual, and spiritual sovereignty is an accurate measure of colonialist relations**. **The dream of sovereignty** in all of these realms, thus, **forms the foundation of Red pedagogy**. As such, indige- nous responses o the international, transnational, postcolonial question are discussed in terms of Lyons's quest for a "nation-people," and Alfred's ( 1999) model for self-determined and self-directed communities. **[Continued…]** In the words of Peter McLaren, "one of the first casualties of war is truth." History, in other words, belongs to the victors (McLaren 2003, 289). Perhaps no one understands this better than indigenous peoples who, in addition to suffering the depredations of genocide, colonization, and cultural annihila- tion, have been revictimized at the hands of whitestream history. The lesson here is pedagogical. The imperative before us, as educators, is to ensure that we engage a thorough examination of the causes and effects of all wars, conflicts, and inter/ intracultural encounters. We must engage the best of our creative and critical capacities to discern the path of social justice and then follow it. **The ongoing injustices of the world call educators-as-students-as-activists to work together—to be in solidarity as we work to change the history of empire and struggle in the** common **project of decolonization**. To do so requires courage, humility, and love *(muna).* Moreover, revolutionary scholars remind us that "our struggle must not stop at calling for better wages and living conditions for teachers and other workers but must anticipate an alternative to capitalism that will bring about a better chance for democracy to live up to its promise" (McLaren 2003, 290). Though the promise of democracy has always been specious for American In- dians, the notion of an anticapitalist society has not. Indigenous peoples con- tinue to present such an alter-native vision, persisting in their lived experience of collectivity and connection to land, both of which vehemently defy capi- talist desire. **Red pedagogy is the manifestation of sovereignty, engaging the devel- opment of "community-based power"** in the interest of "a responsible po-itical, economic, and spiritual society"12 (Richardson and Villenas 2000, 272). Power in this context refers to the practice of "living out active pres- ences and *survivances* rather than an illusionary democracy"( Richardson and Villenas 2000, 273). As articulated by Vizenor, the notion of ***survivance* signifies a state of being beyond** "**survival**, endurance, or a mere response to colonization," **toward** "an active presence . . . and **active repu- diation of dominance**, tragedy and victimry"(Vizenor 1998, 15). The ***survivance* narratives** of indigenous peoples are those that **articulate the active** recovery, **reimagination, and reinvestment of indigenous ways of being**. **These narratives assert the struggles of indigenous peoples and the lived reality of colonization as** a **complexity** that extends far beyond the param- eters of economic capitalist oppression. Survivance narratives form the basis of a Red pedagogy. They compel it to move beyond romantic calls to an imagined past toward the development of a viable, competing moral vision. Specifically, **a Red pedagogy implores our conversations about power to include an examination of responsibility**, to consider our collective need "to live poorer and waste less." It implores strug- gles for human rights to move beyond the anthropocentric discourse of humans-only and to fetter battles for "voice" with an appreciation for silence. In the end a **Red pedagogy embraces an educative process that works to reenchant the universe, to reconnect peoples to the land**, and is as much about be- lief and acquiescence as it is about questioning and empowerment. In so do- ing, **it defines a viable space for tradition, rather than working to "rupture" our connections to it**. The hope is that **such a pedagogy will help shape** schoolsand processes of **learning around the "decolonial imaginary."** Within this fourth space of being, **the dream is that indigenous and nonindigenous peoples will work in solidarity to envision a way of life free of exploitation and replete with spirit**. **The invitation is** for scholars, educators, and students **to exercise critical con- sciousness at the same time they recognize that the world of knowledge far exceeds our ability to know**. **It beckons all of us to acknowledge that only the mountain commands reverence, the bird freedom of thought, and the land comprehension of time**. With this spirit in mind, I proceed on my own jour- ney to learn, to teach, and to be.

#### And, The condition of ethics is a system of recognition – subjectivity is created in response to our relations with others. These relationships of recognition are governed by norms that precede any individual subject and condition how subjects interact with each other.

**Butler 01[[2]](#footnote-2)**

In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over- looked the fact that the very being of **the self is dependent** not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also **on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other** sees and listens and knows and **recognizes is also subject to a critical opening**. **This** opening **calls into question the limits of established regimes of truth**, where a certain risking of the self be- comes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue [see Foucault]. Whether or not the Other is singular, **the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability**. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, **the norms** are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they **introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition** as an encounter. For **if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you**, for instance, **then I take seri- ously that the recognition comes from me**. **But** in the moment that I realize that **the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone**, that I did not singlehandedly make them,then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, **I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use**. As Hegel would have it, recognition cannot be unilaterally given. In the moment that I give it, I am potentially given it, and the form by which I offer it is one that potentially is given to me. In this sense, one might say, I can never offer it, in the Hegelian sense, as a pure offering, since I am receiving it, at least potentially and structurally, in the moment, in the act, of giving. We might ask, as Levinas surely has, what kind of gift this is that returns to me so quickly, that never really leaves my hands. Is it the case that recognition consists, as it does for Hegel, in a reciprocal act whereby I recognize that the Other is structured in the same way that I am, and I recognize that the Other also makes, or can make, this very recognition of sameness? Or is there perhaps an encoun- ter with alterity here that is not reducible to sameness? If it is the latter, how are we to understand this alterity? On the one hand, the Hegelian Other is always found outside, or at least it is first found outside, and only later recognized to be constitutive. This has led critics of Hegel to conclude that the Hegelian subject effects a wholesale assimila- tion of what is external to it into a set of internal features of itself, and that its character- istic gesture is one of appropriation. There are other readings of Hegel, however, that insist that the relation to the Other is ecstatic,' that the "I" repeatedly finds itself outside itself, and that it cannot put an end to this repeated upsurge of its own exteriority. **I am**, as it were, **always other to myself, and there is no final moment in which my return to myself takes place**. In fact, **the encounters I undergo**, if we are to follow the Phenom- enology of Spirit, **are** **those by which I am invariably transformed**; **recognition becomes the process by which I become other than what I was and**, therefore, also, **the process by which I cease to be able to return to what I was**. There is, then, a constitutive loss in the process of recognition, a transformation that does not bring all that once was forward with it, one that forecloses upon the past in an irreversible way. Moreover, it is one in which the "return to self' becomes impossible for another reason as well: there is no staying inside. I am compelled and comported outside myself; I find that **the only way to know myself is precisely through a mediation that takes place outside of me**, exterior to me, **in a** convention or a **norm that I did not make**, in which I cannot discern myself as an author or an agent of its making. In this sense, then, the subject of recognition is one for whom a vacillation between loss and ecstasy is inevitable. **The** **possibility of the "I," of speaking and knowing the "I," resides in a perspective that dislocates the first-person perspective whose very condition it supplies.**

#### And, Universal truths that are applied to specific situations don’t account for recognition because they attempt to generate rules before an event has happened and apply it after the event it has occurred, but ethical obligations only exist in relations to others.

#### And, power relations in social frames affect the specific form that recognition takes, but recognition is a prerequisite to any normative system regardless of the distribution of power.

**Butler 01[[3]](#footnote-3)**

Although the Hegelian account has been criticized for its insistence on the dyad, the Subject and its Other, it is important to see what the **struggle for recognition reveals** about **the inadequacy of the dyad as a frame of reference**. After all, **what follows** from this scene, eventually, **is a** system of customs and, hence, **a social account of the norms by which reciprocal recognition might be sustained in ways that are more stable than the life-and-death struggle would imply**. When we ask, by virtue of what exteriority is recognition conferred?, we find that **it cannot be the particular endowment of the Other who is able** to know and **to recognize me, since that Other will also have to rely upon a certain criterion to establish what will** and will not **be recognizable**, a frame for seeing and judging. In this sense, **if the Other confers recognition**-and we have yet to know precisely in what that consists-**it does this not** primarily **by virtue of special internal capacities**. **There is already not only an epistemological frame** within which the face appears, **but** **an operation of power** as well, **since only by virtue of certain** kinds of anthropocentric dispositions and cultural **frames will a given face seem to be** a **human** face to any one of us. After all, **under what conditions do some individuals acquire a face**, a legible and visible face, and others do not? **There is a language that frames the encounter, and embedded in that language a set of norms concerning what will and will not constitute recognizability**. This is Foucault's point and, in a way, his supplement to Hegel, when he asks, as he does, "What can I become, given the contemporary order of being?" He understands that this "**order**" **conditions the possibility of** his **becoming**, **and** that **a regime of truth**, in his words, **constrains what will** and will not **constitute** **the** truth of his **self**, the truth he offers about himself, **the truth by which he might be known and become recognizably human**, the account he might give of himself. If the social theory of recognition, however, insists upon the impersonal operation of the norm in constituting recognizability, **a critique** from another direction **demands a rethinking of singularity**. In a Levinasian vein-though perhaps more decidedly Arendtian-the Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero argues that the question to ask is not "what" we are, as if the task were simply to fill in the content of our personhood. The question is not primarily a reflexive one, as it is for Foucault, when he asks, "what can I become?" For her, **the very structure of address**, that through which the question is posed, **gives us the clue to understanding the significance of the question itself**. For her, the question most central to recognition is a direct one, and it is addressed to the Other: "who are you?" **This question assumes that there is an Other before us**, one we do not know, **whom we cannot fully apprehend**, one whose uniqueness and nonsubstitutability set a limit to the model of reciprocal recognition offered within the Hegelian scheme, and to the possibility of knowing another more generally. Cavarero argues **that we are beings who are**, of necessity, **exposed to one another, and that our political situation consists in part in learning how best to handle this constant and necessary exposure**. In a sense, **this theory of the "outside" to the subject radicalizes the ecstatic trend in the Hegelian position**. In her view, I am not, as it were, an interior subject, closed upon myself, solipsistic, posing questions of myself alone. **I exist in an important sense for you, and by virtue of you. If I have lost the conditions of address, if I have no "you" to address, then I have lost "myself."** In her view, one can only tell an autobiography, **one can only reference an "I" in relation to a "you": without the "you," my own story be- comes impossible.**

#### And, in order to generate obligations about what an agent ought to do, you have to acknowledge the importance of recognition because under any distribution of power, recognition determines obligations to other. Absent a conception of recognition in 1NC Ks, reject the K because it doesn’t account for how agents move within the power relations that it critiques, so it can’t generate actions.

#### And, the value of a life depends on its grievability, its ability to be mourned – Some lives are excluded from these systems of recognition which leaves them vulnerable to the violence of social exclusion.

**Butler 09[[4]](#footnote-4)**

We read about lives lost and are often given the numbers, but these stories are repeated every day, and the repetition appears endless, irremediable. And so, we have to ask, what would it take not only to apprehend the precarious character of lives lost in war, but to have that apprehension coincide with an ethical and political opposition to the losses war entails? Among the questions that follow from this situation are: How is affect produced by this structure of the frame? And what is the relation of affect to ethical and political judgment and practice? **To say that a life is precarious requires** not only that a life be apprehended as a life, but also **that precariousness be an aspect of what is apprehended in what is living.** Normatively construed, I am arguing that there ought to be **a more inclusive and egalitarian way of recognizing precariousness**, and that this **should take form as concrete social policy** regarding such issues as shelter, work, food, medical care, and legal status. And yet, I am also insisting, in a way that might seem initially paradoxical, **that precariousness itself cannot be properly recognized**. **It can be** apprehended, taken in, **encountered**, **and it can be presupposed by certain norms of recognition just as it can be refused by such norms.** Indeed, **there ought to be recognition of precariousness as a shared condition of human life** (indeed, as a condition that links human and non-human animals), **but we ought not to think that the recognition of precariousness** masters or **captures** or even fully cognizes **what it recognizes**. So although I would (and will) argue that norms of recognition ought to be based on an apprehension of precariousness, I do not think that precariousness is a function or effect of recognition, nor that recognition is the only or the best way to register precariousness. **To** **say that a life** is injurable, for instance, or that it **can be lost**, destroyed, or systematically neglected to the point of death, **is to underscore not only the finitude of a life** (that death is certain) **but also its precariousness** (that life requires various social and economic conditions to be met in order to be sustained as a life). Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one's life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all. Reciprocally, it implies being impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom remain anonymous. These are not necessarily relations of love or even of care, but constitute obligations toward others, most of whom we cannot name and do not know, and who may or may not bear traits of familiarity to an established sense of who "we" are. In the interest of speaking in common parlance, we could say that "we" have such obligations to "others" and presume that we know who "we" are in such an instance. The social implication of this view,however, is precisely that **the "we"** does not, and **cannot**, **recognize itself, that it is riven from the start**, interrupted by alterity, as Levinas has said, and **the obligations "we" have are precisely those that disrupt any established notion of the "we."** Over and against an existential concept of finitude that singularizes our relation to death and to life, precariousness underscores our radical substitutability and anonymity in relation both to certain socially facilitated modes of dying and death and to other socially conditioned modes of persisting and flourishing. It is not that we are born and then later become precarious, but rather that precariousness is coextensive with birth itself (birth is, by definition, precarious), which means that it matters whether or not this infant being survives, and that its survival is dependent on what we might call a social network of hands. Precisely because a living being may die, it is necessary to care for that being so that it may live. **Only under conditions in which the loss would matter does the value of the life appear**. Thus, **grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters**. For the most part, we imagine that an infant comes into the world, is sustained in and by that world through to adulthood and old age, and finally dies. We imagine that when the child is wanted, there is celebration at the beginning of life. **But there can be no celebration without an implicit understanding that the life is grievable**, that it would be grieved if it were lost, and that this future anterior is installed as the condition of its life. In ordinary language, **grief attends the life that has already been lived, and presupposes that life as having ended**. But, according to the future anterior (which is also part of ordinary language), grievability is a condition of a life's emergence and sustenance. 7 The future anterior, "a life has been lived," is presupposed at the beginning of a life that has only begun to be lived. In other words, "this will be a life that will have been lived" is the presupposition of a grievable life, which means that this will be a life that can be regarded as a life, and be sustained by that regard. **Without grievability, there is no life,** or, rather, there is something living that is other than life. Instead, "**there is a life that will never have been lived**," sustained by no regard, no testimony, and **ungrieved when lost**. **The apprehension of grievability** precedes and **makes possible the apprehension of precarious life.** Grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of the living being as living, exposed to non-life from the start.

#### Thus, the standard is Recognizing the Grievability of Lives. This framework contextualizes what oppression is and how we can solve oppression.

#### And, Impact Calc:

#### Grievability rejects ends based evaluation because recognition is a relationship we have between individuals that cannot be aggregated or compared to other relationships, so offense back to the standard constitutes the potential for recognizing others within our ethical frame, not the quality or quantity of recognition that we have.

#### Arguments based in static notions of identity don’t link back to the standard because the recognition they require is not including individuals but isolating a characteristic of those individuals to recognize.

#### The method of the aff is the principal of recognition, if you find a problem that people aren’t included, the response shouldn’t be just to reject the principal but to change the world to recognize them and bring them into the moral sphere – that what the aff does. If you don’t engage in that method you can’t generate obligations for correct courses of actions because you can’t revise them, you would just reject them

#### Intelligability may cause ontological harm, but you can only generate obligations as to what agents should do if you understand yourself and others as a subject so we should accept the harms of recognition because without recognition there is no way to take actions because obligations take the form of agent x ought to do y.

#### And, I advocate that countries ought to prohibit production of nuclear power as a general maxim – however I’ll accept neg preferences on spec and implementation in CX so long as they don’t force me to abandon the general maxim.

## Offense

#### The effects of nuclear power production destroy Indigenous communities through hidden uranium mining and waste depositing. These disasters are kept hidden from and ignored by the public.

**Matsunaga 06[[5]](#footnote-5)**

The impact of **nuclear industrialism** and militarism symbolicly **represents** both the local and global **destruction of** the **people and** the **environment**. **Uranium mines,** mills, **nuclear facilities,** testing, **waste disposal** and aftermath of bombing **affect** particular places, including Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Southwestern **Native communities** in the US; meanwhile, the threat of nuclear arms forces the world to face the possibility of global environmental destruction, as Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth demonstrates. Ortiz writes of the first atomic bomb exploded at White Sands: Although the people have known the experience and difficulty of loss, they did not understand the meaning of that strange dawn in 1945 and in some ways they still don't. And it is because U.S. society doesn't understand either and refuses to deal with it. Thorough knowledge was what was always required to live by for Indian people, but since the Mericano, **knowledge has been kept** in some **hidden** place **and has been used as controlling power**. (Woven Stone 353). **Many** people **participated in the destruction of local communities and environments** in order **to create nuclear armaments, but the way their work fits into** the bigger picture of **global nuclear colonization was not clear to many** of them. Indeed, the environmental, cultural, and economic impacts of nuclear colonialism in the American Southwest, or "radioactive colonialism," have only recently started to receive public attention. Terry Tempest Williams' Refuge published in 1991 surprised her readers by disclosing that fallout from nuclear tests in Nevada could affect the natural habitat of birds as well as ordinary people like Williams' mother and herself. Williams' work also recognizes that the southwestern desert areas, especially the Four Corners Area, are homeland to Native American tribes and Mormons. Rebecca Solnit's Savage Dreams (1994) depicts the effects of the nuclear industry on southwestern Native America, and Ellen Amoi, in The Last Cheater's Waltz (1999) acknowledges Southwesterners' relationship to the land, while describing the way in which the military and nuclear industry have biologically damaged areas such as the Colorado Plateau, Trinity in New Mexico, and Nevada test sites. In The Tainted Desert, Valerie L Kuletz points out that **the majority of sites** designated **for nuclear production, testing, and waste disposal are on lands belonging to Native Americans** in the Southwest and that **the nuclear exploitation of Hopi, Pueblo, Ute, and Navajo lands has been made "invisible" to** many **non-Indian citizens** of the regions: Throughout the period of **above-ground nuclear bomb testing at the Nevada Test Site** in the 1950s and early '60s, **the mushroom clouds could be seen from the China Lake testing ranges**--if one knew where to look and when, and people did.... **What was not visible in this area were the Indians, those other occupants of desert valleys, mountains, and desert springs**.... Throughout my youth in the late '50s, '60s, and '70s Indians--Western Shoshone, Timbisha Shoshone, and Owens Vally Paiute--were invisible. They weren't not there, they were simply invisible to most (although not all) of the white scientific research community and their families. (xv) While Kulet reveals the "invisibility" of Native America, Oritz explains why **Native America has been made "invisible"**: "It was no exceptional decision that Los Alamos Laboratories were located where they were nor where the atomic bomb would be exploded. This was the remote barren west afterall, and only a few Indians were there. Therefore, uranium was 'discovered' in the Four Corners region of the Southwest on and near Indian lands" (354). As Ortiz sees it, the way the "**white scientific research community**" **conveniently neglected to see the exploitation of Native America** is just a continuation of nineteenth-century Indian policy: " the era of Jacksonian democracy and the Seventh Cavalry and the setup of the reservation and land allotment system" (Woven Stone 354). Although made "invisible" until recently (in the late 70s and 80s), the history relating to the "National Sacrifice Area" of the Southwest began as early as the 1940's. Kuletz describes the intersection of two landscapes, the "Indian" and the "nuclear." In the 40s,the larger part of the **land occupied by Navajos, Hopis, Pueblos, and Utes was exploited for uranium mining** and milling. **The uranium extracted from these places became the material for the atomic bomb developed in Los Alamos, New Mexico, adjacent to Pueblo land**. In 1945, **the first bomb testing was conducted in** Alamogordo (**White Sands**) near the Mescalero Apache reservation, **and** since 1950, **lands of the Western Shoshone and Southern Paiute have been used as the Nevada Test Site**. Moreover, low-, middle-, and high-level **nuclear waste disposal facilities are located on Paiute, Shoshone, and Pueblo reservations** (Kulez 12). Although **imperceptible to the American public**, the reality of nuclear colonization in the Southwest and its impact on people and the land was not invisible to Simon J. Ortiz. This was, after all, his community, his people, his family, himself. Especially in the "Fight Back" section of Woven Stone, Ortiz focuses on how the nuclear reality affects the lives of his community culturally, economically, and ecologically, and this text stands as a strong protest against nuclear colonization. Ortiz's voice, however, goes beyond mere protest; Ortiz's "fight" against nuclear colonization is a guide that could ultimately alter the ways society facilitates and relies on nuclear industrialization and militarism. The nuclear colonization of the Southwest is only one brief period in a long history of colonization. Just as his father and their ancestors did, Ortiz witnesses capitalism increasingly encroach upon the health and economic system of his community as well as the natural environment. Ortiz writes, "Most of the railroad workers I ever saw were Indians, Indo-Hispanos, and Blacks, with occasional Okies, and the foremen were always white. My father firmly said that he did not wish for me and my brothers to ever work for the Santa Fe railroad" (356-57). Despite his father's wish, Ortiz followed his father's footsteps and became a physical laborer. When the uranium mines and mills opened near his home in the 1950s, Ortiz started working at one because "we were poor, and education beyond high school was not a likely opportunity" (357). For Ortiz, working for the railroad or working at the uranium mines and mills are similar; they are both conditions of colonization. Like the railroad, **the uranium industry became a tool to exploit Native America in the name of "national security"** or "free enterprise." **The employment "opportunities" provided by** the railroad and **the uranium industry continues the invasion initiated during the Spanish conquest** of Aacqu, Acoma Pueblo, in 1540. As Ortiz points out, "There was no visible gold or jewels or treasure as had been fabled, but the land and people were obviously productive and the potential for colonization and profit was worthy of royal and private investment" (342). By rehearsing the various forms of Native American colonization, Ortiz proves that it is not an individual event in the past, but an inheritance that continues today as nuclear colonization.

#### And, nuclear development relies upon the rhetorical exclusion and non recognition of the demands of marginalized communities.

**Endres 09[[6]](#footnote-6)**

**Nuclear colonialism is** inextricably **linked** **to** the concept of **rhetorical exclusion**. According to John Sanchez, Mary Stuckey and Richard Morris **rhetorical exclusion is employed by those in power to ‘‘foreclose debate without appearing to engage in undemocratic action.’’**46 Using American Indian Movement (AIM) activism and the case of Leonard Peltier as examples, **they reveal that rhetorical exclusion provides ‘‘frames through which those who challenge the status quo may be understood.’**’47 In their analysis, **rhetorical exclusion is** primarily **a strategy of definition**. **They reveal the numerous ways that the federal government’s discourse explicitly defines American Indians as subversive, inherently dangerous, oppositional, and always already guilty**. **These definitions build upon and contribute to the assumption that the US federal government is** democratic, **legitimate**, and inherently worthy of defense against any threats (i.e., American Indians). Rhetorical exclusion, then, is a strategy of definition that justifies taking ‘‘whatever actions those in power deem necessary to control challenges to its legitimacy.’’48 Despite the nuanced analysis offered by Sanchez, Stuckey and Morris, their articulation of the strategy of definition discussed above is not the only strategy of rhetorical exclusion in discourse about American Indians. Rather, their discussion of rhetorical exclusion provides a starting point for considering the multiple strategies of rhetorical exclusion in different situations.49 Sanchez, Stuckey and Morris’ articulation of rhetorical exclusion is limited to how American Indians are explicitly defined in federal government documents as threatening or subversive. However, this strategy is used in a context very different from that of the Yucca Mountain controversy. In the late 1960s and 1970s, AIM was highly active and widely covered in the media, such as the takeover of Alcatraz and Wounded Knee. AIM activism in the 1970s called forth a rhetorical situation to which the federal government had to respond. However, **even though current American Indian grievances pose as big a threat to the federal government’s modus operandi of colonialism, these issues do not receive** the **national attention** they did in the 1970s. Today, **rhetorical exclusion includes more subtle ways of excluding American Indian voices from deliberation**. This study aims to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of rhetorical exclusion. **The nuclear waste controversy provides a good context for studying rhetorical exclusion**. **Although the nuclear waste crisis is on the radar of many Americans, the relationship between American Indians and nuclear waste is less apparent.** According to a 2002 report by former Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, ‘‘we have a staggering amount of radioactive waste in this country.’’50 **By 2035, there will be approximately 119,000 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste** (well above the 77,000 metric ton limit) at **the Yucca Mountain site**.51 In anticipation of the current waste crisis, **Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act** (NWPA, 1982, amended 1987), **which vested responsibility with the federal government for permanently storing high-level nuclear waste from commercial and governmental sources.** The NWPA provides an immense subsidy for nuclear power industry because it stipulates that Congress assume billions of dollars of financial responsibility for nuclear waste storage. In 2002, the Secretary of Energy, the President, and Congress officially authorized the Yucca Mountain site as the nation’s first high-level nuclear waste repository. **The site authorization was widely opposed by Western Shoshone and Southern Paiute nations who claim treaty-based and spiritual rights to the land**. Other American Indian nations and indigenous organizations also opposed the site authorization decision because of its role in nuclear colonialism. My analysis reveals that **the federal government**, specifically the Department of Energy (DOE), **rhetorically excluded American Indians** and their arguments **from the** Yucca Mountain site authorization **decision process**. However, before discussing the rhetorical exclusion of American Indian arguments against the Yucca Mountain site, it is important to establish that there were indeed arguments against the site.

#### And, governments constantly justify nuclear colonialism on indigenous lands without taking into account the effects on indigenous communities. Current policies don’t view them as grievable.

**Endres 09[[7]](#footnote-7)**

Before attending to the rhetorical nature of nuclear colonialism, it is important to emphasize the scope and material effects of nuclear technologies on indigenous peoples and their lands. This is a history of systematic exploitation and indigenous resistance, spanning from the 1940s to present. As the Indigenous Environmental Network writes, **the nuclear industry has waged** an undeclared **war against** our **Indigenous peoples** and Pacific Islanders that has poisoned our communities worldwide. For more than 50 years, the legacy of the nuclear chain, fromexploration to the dumping of **radioactive waste has been proven**, through documentation, **to be genocide and ethnocide** and a deadly enemy of Indigenous peoples. ... United States federal law and nuclear **policy** has not protected Indigenous peoples, and in fact **has** **been created to allow the nuclear industry to continue operations at the expense of our land,** territory, **health and traditional ways of life**. ... This disproportionate toxic burden\*called **environmental racism**\***has culminated in** the current **attempts to dump** much of the nation’s **nuclear waste in the homelands of the Indigenous peoples** of the Great Basin region of the United States.4 From an indigenous perspective, **the material consequences of nuclear colonialism have affected the vitality of indigenous peoples**. This can be seen clearly in both uranium mining and nuclear testing. **Uranium mining is inextricably linked with indigenous peoples**. According to LaDuke, ‘‘some 70 percent of the world’s uranium originates from Native Communities.’’5 Within the US, approximately 66 percent of the known uranium deposits are on reservation land, as much as 80 percent are on treaty-guaranteed land, and up to 90 percent of uranium mining and milling occurs on or adjacent to American Indian land.6 To support the federal government’s desire for nuclear weapons and power production, the Bureau of Indians Affairs (BIA) has worked in collusion with the Atomic Energy Commission and corporations such as Kerr-McGee and United Nuclear to negotiate leases with Navajo, Lakota and other nations for uranium mining and milling on their land between the 1950s to the present.7 BIAnegotiated leases are supported by the complex body of Indian Law, which I will demonstrate enables federal intrusion into American Indian lands and governmental affairs. These leases are heavily tilted in favor of the corporations so that American Indian nations received only about 3.4 percent of the market value of the uranium and low paid jobs.8 **Uranium mining has also resulted in severe health and environmental legacies for** affected **American Indian people and their lands**. From uranium mining on Navajo land, there have been at least 450 reported cancer deaths among Navajo mining employees.9 Even now, **the legacy of over 1000 abandoned mines and uranium tailing piles is radioactive dust that continues to put people living near tailing piles at a high risk for lung cancer**.10 The history of exploitation and resistance continues with nuclear weapons production. As nuclear engineer Arjun Makhijani argues, ‘‘all too often such damage has been done to ethnic minorities or on colonial lands or both. The main sites for testing nuclear weapons for every declared nuclear power are on tribal or minority lands.’’11 From 1951 to 1992, over 900 nuclear weapons tests were conducted on the Nevada Test Site (NTS)\*land claimed by the Western Shoshone under the 1863 Treaty of Ruby Valley. The late Western Shoshone spiritual leader Corbin Harney proclaimed Western Shoshone to be ‘‘the most nuclear bombed nation in the world.’’12 According to Western Shoshone Virginia Sanchez, indigenous people may have suffered more radiation exposure because of their land-linked lifestyle of ‘‘picking berries, hunting and gathering our traditional foods,’’ resulting in ‘‘major doses of radiation.’’13 Yet, the federal government and legal system have made only token gestures toward compensating victims of nuclear testing. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA) has strict qualification guidelines that have excluded many downwinders from receiving compensation.14 In addition to the effects on human health from nuclear testing, there is also an environmental toll through contaminated soil and water, which could harm animal and plant life.15 American Indian resistance is an important part of the story of nuclear colonialism. Despite the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act’s limitations, American Indian activists were instrumental in getting it passed. In response to discussion of renewed uranium mining in the US to support new nuclear reactors, the Navajo nation banned uranium mining and the Lakota nation successfully prevented corporate exploration of potential uranium mines on the Pine Ridge reservation.16 The Western Shoshone actively resisted nuclear testing from the 1980s to 1992 and challenged recent proposals that may portend renewed testing at the NTS. Every May, the Shundahai Network sponsors a Mother’s Day event at the Nevada test site, which culminates in a direct action to assert Western Shoshone land rights. Furthermore, resistance from Western Shoshone people and Utah downwinders forced the cancellation of a non-nuclear sub-critical test (Divine Strake) proposed for the NTS in June 2006. Now, with over 60 years of uranium mining, nuclear weapons production and nuclear power, we face a high-level nuclear waste crisis. Once again, power brokers have looked to exploit American Indian lands, resources and peoples. **In the** twentyyear **process of** researching and **authorizing a federal** high-level **nuclear waste repository site, only sites on American Indian land were seriously considered**. In addition to the Yucca Mountain site, American Indian nations were also targeted for temporary waste storage through the now-defunct Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) program.17 And recently, a proposal by Private Fuel Storage (PFS) and the Skull Valley Goshutes to temporarily store nuclear waste at Skull Valley Goshute reservation was defeated by Skull Valley activists working with the State of Utah against the Skull Valley government and PFS.18 The struggle over the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste site is, as Kuletz pointed out, a continuation of struggles against nuclear colonialism: ‘‘Indian protests over the use of Yucca Mountain as a high-level nuclearwaste dump cannot be seen as an anomaly. Rather, they are a part of a persistent pattern of resistance to military occupation and nuclear activity.’’19 Although we do not yet know the health and environmental effects of permanent nuclear waste storage, nuclear colonialism is not just about health and environmental devastation. It also intersects with sovereignty, nuclearism and colonialism, to which I now turn.

## Underview

# Underview Add Ons

### A2 Deleuze

#### Government policies force Indigenous identity into static conception in order to prove that they are “Native” enough to access reservations. Failing to constantly prove an “Indian” bloodline or embracing fluid identity destroys any possible Indigenous culture because the government dismisses you as not “Indian” enough. Postmodern conceptions of identity fluidity only serve to re-entrench white assimilation and destroy Indigenous culture.

Grande 04**[[8]](#footnote-8)** **bracketed for language**

The broad aim of this chapter is to reveal how the current obsession with questions of identity and authenticity obscures the sociopolitical and material conditions of American Indian communities. Indeed, questions of who or what is an American Indian, who should be allowed to speak from the au- thority of that voice, who can conduct research on behalf of American Indian communities, and what counts as the "real" Indian history dominate the dis- course in a manner that suggests to the non-Indian world that the primary struggle of American Indians is the problem of forging a "comfortable mod- ern identity." By displacing the real sites of struggle (sovereignty and self- determination), the discourse of identity politics ultimately obfuscates the real sources of oppression—colonialism and global capitalism. The connection between identity politics and capitalist imperatives is per- haps most readily seen in the context of higher education, where battles over authenticity are waged in the for-profit arenas of admissions, faculty recruit- ment, affirmative action, and scholarship. Allegations of otherwise "white" individuals committing "ethnic fraud" further muddy the waters of an already impossible debate. Regrettably, as the academy preoccupies itself with ferret- ing "fraudulent" Indians and debunking bogus research, continued assaults on American Indian lands, cultures, and communities proceed with little public notice and even less public outrage. The discourse of "authenticity" is underwritten by "essentialist" theories of identity. That is, theories of identity that treat race (and other aspects of iden- tity) as a stable and homogenous construct, as if members of different racial groups possessed "some innate and invariant set of characteristics" that set them apart from each other as well as from whites (McCarthy and Crichlow 1993, xviii). Critical scholars critique such essentialist theories, contending that they grossly undertheorize identity, muting its inherent complexities and contradictions. They not only reject the notion that group membership can be reduced to lists of essential characteristics but also contest such practices as, at best, inaccurate, and, at worst, racist. In contrast, critical scholars advocate theories of difference firmly rooted in the "discourses of power, democracy, social justice and historical memory" (McLaren and Giroux 1997, 17), liberating "identity" from the specious dis- course of "authenticity" and re-centering it in the context of power. In so do- ing, they replace the relatively static notion of "identity" (a fixed, passively inherited entity that one is endowed with) with the more fluid concept of "subjectivity" (the active and continuous "product of human work") (Said 1993, xix). The **postmodern discourse of subjectivity spawned a** whole **new** language among critical scholars, with a variety of constructs emerging to express the profound **contingency of "identity"**: border cultures, border- crossers, mestiza, *Xicanisma,* postcolonial hybridities, cyborg identities, and *mestizaje* are just some of the emergent concepts formulated to explain and bring language to the experience of multiplicity, relationality, and transgres- sion as they relate to identity (Anzaldua 1987; Delgado Bernal 1998; Castillo 1995; Harraway 1991; Darder, Tones, and Gutierrez 1997; McLaren and Sleeter 1995; Valle and Tones 1995). Such constructs posit subjectivity as being radically contingent, continu- ally shifting along axes of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and aggressively dismissing the notion that one "is" anything. In other words, in the border- lands of subjectivity, the only normative standard is hybridity, wherein the modernist "borders" of identity are contested, particularly those that have been placed in binary opposition: self/other, male/female, black/white, het- erosexual/homosexual, and organism/machine. Indeed, critical scholars ad- vocate the dissolution or disregard for borders of any sort, calling for subjects to actively contest these artificial boundaries, to "border-cross" and trans- gress,' embracing the "spaces-in-between." Such acts are viewed as democ- ratizing contestations wherein the implosion of center and margin creates a space of "intersection," a space of possibility where new cultures can be created— una *cultura mestizo* (Anzaldda 1987). As such, thepostmodern no- tion of subjectivity not only contests essentialist constructions of identity but also the hegemony of whiteness as the normative standard for all subjects. For critical scholars, the development of more complex and inclusive un- derstandings of identity is crucial to the democratic project. Through ruptur- ing the concretized categories of identity, critical theorists imagine a new so- cial order wherein transgression and *mestizaje* dismantle the old social order and therefore the existing relations of exploitation. In short, transgression is linked to the creation of greater possibilities for political solidarity and soli- darity to the hope of democracy**.** The persistent belief in the superiority and emancipatory powers of de- mocracy, even among radical scholars, indicates the degree to which whitestream America has never really understood what it means to be Indian and even less about what it means to be tribal. This ignorance has deep his- torical roots and even wider political implications. Indeed, as previously dis- cussed, the uncompromising belief in the superiority of Western social and political structures —that is, democracy and citizenship—was the motivating force behind the numerous expurgatory campaigns exacted against indige- nous peoples. The Civilization Act of 1819, the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the General Allotment Act of 1887, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 are just a sample of the myriad legal mechanisms imposed on tribal America in the name of "democracy." While critical theorists contest the hegemonic forces that eventuated this "imposition," they also continue to presume the normalcy of the democratic order. **This presumption fails to account for the "difference" of American In- dian tribal identity—specifically, what it means to be sovereign, tribal peo- ples within the geopolitical confines of the U**nited **S**tates. Native scholars, thus, remain skeptical of the "new" political project, viewing it as simply the latest in a long line of political endeavors aimed at absorbing American Indi- ans into the prevailing model of the "democratic citizen."In response, indigenous scholars have worked hard to articulate the "dif- ference" of tribal identity, distinguishing it, both legally and culturally, from mainstream conceptions of identity. Such efforts have been, in some ways, shaped by the need for a collective indigenous response to the dehumanizing and racist depictions of Indian-ness put forth by whitestream America. As such, the emergent counterhegemonic discourse generated antiracist and highly idealized constructions of American Indian identity and culture. War- rior (1995) notes the mid-1980s as the height of when idealized images of American Indians flooded the marketplace with writings about the benevolent "Indian worldview" dominating the discourse. Of this era Warrior states, "such a commitment to essentialized indigenous worldviews and conscious- ness became . . . a pervasive and almost requisite feature of American Indian critical writing" (1995, xvii). Though a cadre of indigenous scholars have always expressed resistance to essentialist depictions of American Indian culture and identity (e.g., Chrytos, Deloria, Durham, Forbes, Vizenor, and Warrior), they continue to hold sway. In particular, communities struggling to fetter the impact of colonialist forces—specifically, identity appropriation ("ethnic fraud"), cultural imperi- alism, and corporate commodification— are compelled by essentialist definitions of Indian-ness and the clearly demarcated lines between "us" and "them." The project of defining a contemporary Indian identity is, thus, highly mediated by whitestream forces, particularly the homogenizing effects of global capitalism. This reality exposes the perceived existential crisis of identity as in actuality a crisis of power. Specifically, the power to name, shape, and control the products and conditions of one's life and particularly one's labor. As a result, the "crisis" of **American Indian identity is** perhaps better ar- ticulated as **an identity paradox**. That is, **at the same time the relentless cadence of colonialist forces necessitates American Indians to retain** more closed or **"essentialist" constructions of Indian-ness, the challenges of their own "burgeoning multiculturalism" requires the construction of** more open, **fluid**, and "transgressive" **definitions** of Indian-ness. This paradox or the ten- sion between the urgency to border-cross and impulse to border-patrol is one of the central themes of this chapter. More specifically, I aim to reveal how the rancor of identity politics has not only deeply compromised the power of American Indians to mediate the forces of colonialism and global capitalism but also how dominant modes of educational theory have failed to construct models of identity that effectively interrogate and disrupt the project of col- onization.The discussion begins with an examination of the legal and political forces that have shaped the historical formation of American Indian identity. Then, a contemporary model of "the difference of tribal identity" is articulated as a by-product of these historical forces. Next, the dominant modes of identity theory—left-essentialism and postmodernism—are examined in terms of their intersection with current formations of American Indian identity. This analysis reveals how **whitestream theories of identity have not only failed to interrogate and disrupt the project of colonization but have also provided the theoretical basis and intellectual space for its continuance**. More specifically, the colonialist forces of corporate commodification, identity appropriation, and cultural imperialism are discussed as the consequences of a geographic and political terrain that aims to absorb indigenous peoples. Finally, concepts that emerge from critical theories of identity — specifi- cally the construct of *mestizaje* and other models of hybridity —are exam- ined as potential tools for developing a counterdiscourse of American Indian subjectivity. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the need for an in- digenous theory of identity—one historically grounded in indigenous strug- gles for self-determination, politically centered in issues of sovereignty, and spiritually guided by the religious traditions of American Indian peoples. The aim is to develop an emancipatory theory —a new Red pedagogy—that acts as a true counterdiscourse, counterpraxis, counterensoulment2of in- digenous identity. THE HISTORICAL FORMATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN IDENTITY: TOWARD A MODEL OF TRIBAL IDENTITY The "discovery" of natives in the so-called New World offered one of the greatest challenges to Europeans' accepted notions of self, personhood, and culture. Hayden White (1976, 133) notes that their encounter with a race of "wild men" created a crisis of category for the general notion of "humanity" developed in Western philosophy, igniting a debate between two opposing views of Indians: On the one hand, natives were conceived to be continuous with the humanity on which Europeans prided themselves; and it was this mode of relationship that underlay the policy of proselytization and conversion. On the other hand, the natives could be conceived as simply existing contiguously to Europeans, as representing either an inferior breed of humanity or a superior breed, but in any case being essentially different from the European breed; and it was this mode of relationship that underlay the policies of war and extermination which the Europeans followed throughout the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century. At stake for the colonizers was not only the prospect of acquiring religious converts but also of defining the terms of political engagement— were the na- tives "the same" and therefore deserving of equal rights or were they inferior deserving of no rights at all? Such questions were critical for a young de- mocracy working to build its notion of democratic citizenship on the "truths" of individualism and private property. **The bloody encounter** between these operational truths and those of the In- dian nations **came to a head in 1887 with the** passage of the **General Allotment Act.** As discussed in chapter 2, Senator Henry Dawes spearheaded a campaign to rid the nation of tribalism through the virtues of private property, allotting land parcels to Indian heads of family. **Before allotments could be dispensed**, however, **the government had to determine which Indians were eligible, ignite[ed]ing the official search for a federal definition of Indian-ness. The task of defining "Indian-ness" was assigned to the Dawes commission, a delegation of white men who** facilely **embraced the** prevailing racial purity model, expressing **Indian-ness in terms of blood-quantum**. Satisfied with their quantifiable definition of Indian-ness, Dawes commis- sioners dispersed into the field, interviewing thousands of Indians about their "origins." Much to their dismay, federal officials found that "after forced re- locations, intermarriages, absconded parents, informal adoptions, and civil wars" many Indians had only fuzzy ideas of their origins and little knowledge of their blood-quantum (Malcomson 2000, 16). **Since there was no "scientific" means of determining precise bloodlines, commission members** often **ascribed blood status based on** their own **racist notions of what it meant to be Indian**—designating full-blood status to "poorly assimilated" Indians and mixed-blood status to those who most resembled whites. As a result, a sig- nificant number of Indians refused to comply with the process of racial cate- gorization (Malcomson 2000). Unfazed, the Dawes Commission published the first comprehensive tribal rolls neatly listing names in one column and blood quanta in another; designating F for "full-blood" and 1/2,1/4, or 1/8 for "mixed bloods." Land parcels were dispensed according to the lists and followed their same racist logic. That is, "full-blooded" Indians (considered legally incompetent), received relatively small parcels of land deeded with trust patents over which the government retained complete control for a minimum of twenty-five years. "Mixed-blood" Indians, on the other hand, were deeded larger and bet- ter tracts of land, with "patents in fee simple" (complete control), but were also forced to accept U.S. citizenship and relinquish tribal status (Churchill and Morris 1992; Stiffarm and Lane 1992). In perhaps the most controversial turn, Indians who failed to meet the established criteria were effectively "de- tribalized," deposed of their American Indian identity and displaced from their homelands, discarded into the nebula of the American "otherness."3 Its myriad indiscretions arguably make Dawes the single most destructive U.S. policy. All told, the act empowered the U.S. government to: (1) legally preempt the sovereign right of Indians to define themselves; (2) implement the specious notion of blood-quantum as the legal criteria for defining Indi- ans;4(3) institutionalize divisions between "full-bloods" and "mixed- bloods";5(4) "detribalize" a sizable segment of the Indian population;6and (5) legally appropriate vast tracts of Indian land. Indeed, so "successful" was this aspect of the "democratic experiment" that the federal government de- cided to retain—or rather, further exploit—the notion of blood-quantum and federal recognition as the means for dispensing other resources and services such as health care and educational funding. An Operational Definition of Indian-ness While five centuries of imperialist strategies may have decimated the tradi- tional societies of preinvasion times, modern American Indian communities still resemble traditional societies enough so that, "given a choice between In- dian society and non-Indian society, most Indians feel comfortable with their owninstitutions, lands and traditions" (Deloria and Lytle 1983, xii). Despite the persistent divide between "Indian" and "non-Indian" societies, however, defining tribal America has remained curiously difficult? To tease out, name, and assign primacy to certain aspects of Indian-ness as "the definition" would not only grossly oversimplify the complexity of American Indian subjectivity (forcing what is fundamentally traditional, spatial, and interconnected into the modern, temporal, and epistemic frames of Western theory), but also reenact the objectification of Indians set in motion by the Dawes commission over a century ago. Accordingly, the following rubric merely calls attention to the "difference" of tribal identity as conceived through some of the legal indica- tors of what it means to be American Indian in U.S. society. 8It is not meant to represent some mythic view of a unified indigenous culture or objectified view of American Indian identity. The Difference of Tribal Identity *• Sovereignty vs. Democracy:* American Indians have been engaged in a centuries-long struggle to have what is legally theirs recognized (i.e., land, sovereignty, treaty rights). As such, indigenous peoples have not, like other marginalized groups, been fighting for inclusion in the demo- cratic imaginary, but rather for the right to remain distinct, sovereign, and tribal peoples. *• Treaty Rights:* These rights articulate the unique status of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." A dizzying array of tribal, federal, and state laws, policies, and treaties creates a political maze that keeps the le- gal status of most tribes in a constant state of flux. Treaties are negoti- ated and renegotiated in a process that typically reduces tribal rights and erodes traditional structures (Deloria and Lytle 1984; Fixcio 1998). *• Dual Citizenship:* The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 extends the rights of full citizenship to American Indians born within the territorial United States insofar as such status does not infringe upon the rights to tribal and other property. It is a dual citizenship wherein American Indians do not lose civil rights because of their status as tribal members and individual tribal members are not denied tribal rights because of their American cit- izenship (Deloria and Lytle 1984).9 *• Federal Recognition:* **Federal law mandates that American Indians prove that they have continued to exist over time as stable**, prima facie **entities to retain** federal **recognition** as tribes. **Acknowledgment of tribal existence** by the Department of the Interior is critical, as it **is a prerequisite to the protection, services, and benefits** made available by the federal government to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes. Therefore, **a tribe's existence is contingent upon its ability to prove its existence over time**, to provide evidence of shared cultural patterns, and to prove "persistence of **a named, collective Indian identity**" (Bureau of **Indian** Affairs, USD, 83, 7). *Economic Dependency:* American Indians continue to exist as nations within a nation wherein the relationship between the U.S. government and Indian tribes is not the fictive "government to government" relation- ship described in U.S. documents, but, rather, one that positions tribes as fundamentally dependent on the federal government.10 *• Reservations:* Almost two-thirds of American Indians continue to either live on or remain significantly tied to their reservations and, as such, re- main predominantly "tribally oriented" as opposed to generically Indian (Joe and Miller 1997). The above indicators position American Indians in a wholly unique and paradoxical relationship to the United States. They also illuminate the inher- ent contradictions of modern American Indian existence: **the paradox of hav- ing to prove "authenticity" to gain legitimacy** as a "recognized" tribe, **while simultaneously having to negotiate a postmodern world in which all claims to authenticity are dismissed as essentialist** (if not racist). **This reality not only conscripts American Indians to a gravely dangerous** and precarious **space but also points to the gross insufficiency of models that treat American Indians as simply another** ethnic **minority group**. Specifically, **the identity paradox** of American Indians deeply **problema- tizes the postmodern insistence that we move beyond concretized categories and disrupt the "myth" of prima facie** indicators of **identity**. For American Indians, **such notions only reflect whitestream reality**. For instance, **it currently remains a fundamental truth** of Indian reality —no matter how you define it—**that the titles to** Indian **land remain in the hands of the U. S. government**. Moreover, **the U.S. government**—not tribes—**retains the right to confer "federal recognition" and** therefore **the power to enable self- determination**. Indeed, the criteria required for federal recognition are con- structed to protect the rights and interests of the government and not those of Indian tribes. According to the *Indian Definition Study* (1980), the inner contradictions of the current criteria create the following impossible para- dox for tribes: 1. An American Indian is a member of any federally recognized tribe. To be federally recognized, an Indian tribe must be comprised of American Indians. 2. To gain federal recognition, an Indian tribe must have a land base. To secure a land base, an Indian tribe must be federally recognized." So, five hundred years after the European invasion, "recognized" and "un- recognized" **American Indian communities repeatedly find themselves en- gaged in absurd efforts to prove** (in whitestream courts) **their existence over time as stable and distinct groups** of people. Thus, **contrary to postmodern rhetoric, there are in fact, stable markers and prima facie indicators of what it means to be Indian in American society**. Within this context, **indigenous scholars cannot afford to perceive essentialism as a mere theoretical construct and may**, in fact, **be justified in their understanding of it a[i]s the last line of defense against capitalistic encroachment and last available means for retaining cultural** integrity **and tribal sovereignty**. The question therefore remains whether contemporary theories of identity are able to provide any valuable insights to the paradox of American Indian iden- tity formation.

### A2 Extinction

#### Emphasis on an impending apocalypse as the major danger to human life is a direct effacement of the everyday violence of institutionalized racism – the fiction of uniqueness for their extinction impact can only be establish through a genocidal forgetting of the historical world-ending violence of white supremacy

Omolade 89**[[9]](#footnote-9)**

Recent efforts by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan to limit nuclear testing, stockpiling, and weaponry, while still protecting their own arsenals and selling arms to countries and factions around the world, vividly demonstrate how "peace" can become an abstract concept within a culture of war. Many peace activists are similarly blind to the constant wars and threats of war being waged against people of color and the planet by those who march for "peace" and by those they march against. These pacifists, like Gorbachev and Reagan, frequently want people of color to fear what they fear and define peace as they define it. They are unmindful that our lands and peoples have already been and are being destroyed as part of the "final solution" of the "color line."It is difficult to persuade the remnants of Native American tribes**,** the starving of African deserts, and the victims of the Cambodian "killing fields" that nuclear war is the major danger to human life on the planet and that only a nuclear "winter" embodies fear and futurelessness for humanity. The peace movement suffers greatly from its lack of a historical and holistic perspective, practice, and vision that include the voices and experiences of people of color;the movement's goals and messages have therefore been easily coopted and expropriated by world leaders who share the same culture of racial dominance and arrogance. The peace movement's racist blinders have divorced peace from freedom,from feminism, from education reform, from legal rights, from human rights, from international alliances and friendships, from national liberation, from the particular (for example, black female, Native American male) and the general(human being). Nevertheless, social movements such as the civil rights-black power movement in the United States have always demanded peace with justice, with liberation, and with social and economic reconstruction and cultural freedom at home and abroad. The integration of our past and our present holocausts and our struggle to define our own lives and have our basic needs metare at the core of the inseparable struggles for world peace and social betterment. The Achilles heel of the organized peace movement in this country has always been its whiteness. In this multi-racial and racist society, no allwhite movement can have the strength to bring about basic changes. It is axiomatic that basic changes do not occur in any society unless the people who are oppressed move to make them occur. In our society it is people of color who are the most oppressed. Indeed our entire history teaches us that when people of color have organized and struggled-most especially, because of their particular history, Black people-have moved in a more humane direction as a society, toward a better life for all people.1 Western man's whiteness, imagination, enlightened science, and movements toward peace have developed from a culture and history mobilized against women of color.The political advancements of white men have grown directly from the devastation and holocaust of people of color and our lands. This technological and material progress has been in direct proportion to the undevelopment of women of color. Yet the dayto- day survival, political struggles, and rising up of women of color, especially black women in the United States, reveal both complex resistance to holocaust and undevelopment and often conflicted responses to the military and war. The Holocausts Women of color are survivors of and remain casualties of holocausts, and we are direct victims of war**-**that is, of open armed conflict between countries or between factions within the same country. But women of color were not soldiers**,** nor did we trade animal pelts or slaves to the white man for guns**,** nor did we sell or lease our lands to the white man for wealth. Most men and women of color resisted and fought back, were slaughtered, enslaved, and force marched into plantation labor camps to serve the white masters of war and to build their empires and war machines. People of color were and are victims of holocausts-that is, of great and widespread destruction, usually by fire. The world as we knew and created it was destroyed in a continual scorched earth policy of the white man. The experience of Jews and other Europeans under the Nazis can teach us the value of understanding the totality of destructive intent, the extensiveness of torture, and the demonical apparatus of war aimed at the human spirit. A Jewish father pushed his daughter from the lines of certain death at Auschwitz and said, "You will be a remembrance-You tell the story. You survive." She lived. He died. Many have criticized the Jews for forcing non-Jews to remember the 6 million Jews who died under the Nazis and for etching the names Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Terezin and Warsaw in our minds. Yet as women of color, we, too, are "remembrances" of all the holocausts against the people of the world. We must remember the names of concentration camps such as Jesus, Justice, Brotherhood, and Integrity,ships that carried millions of African men, women, and children chained and brutalized across the ocean to the "New World." We must remember the Arawaks, the Taino, the Chickasaw, the Choctaw, the Narragansett, the Montauk, the Delaware, and the other Native American names of thousands of U.S. towns that stand for tribes of people who are no more. We must remember the holocausts visited against the Hawaiians, the aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Pacific Island peoples, and the women and children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We must remember the slaughter of men and women at Sharpeville, the children of Soweto, and the men of Attica**.** We must never, ever, forget the children disfigured, the men maimed, and the women broken in our holocausts-we must remember the names, the numbers, the faces, and the stories and teach them to our children and our children's children so the world can never forget our suffering and our courage. Whereas the particularity of the Jewish holocaust under the Nazis is over, our holocausts continue. We are the madres locos (crazy mothers) in the Argentinian square silently demanding news of our missing kin from the fascists who rule. We are the children of El Salvador who see our mothers and fathers shot in front of our eyes. We are the Palestinian and Lebanese women and children overrun by Israeli, Lebanese, and U.S. soldiers. We are the women and children of the bantustans and refugee camps and the prisoners of Robbin Island. We are the starving in the Sahel, the poor in Brazil, the sterilized in Puerto Rico. We are the brothers and sisters of Grenada who carry the seeds of the New Jewel Movement in our hearts, not daring to speak of it with our lipsyet. Our holocaust is South Africa ruled by men who loved Adolf Hitler, who have developed the Nazi techniques of terror to more sophisticated levels. Passes replace the Nazi badges and stars. Skin color is the ultimate badge of persecution. Forced removals of women, children, and the elderly-the "useless appendages of South Africa"-into barren, arid bantustans without resources for survival have replaced the need for concentration camps. Black sex-segregated barracks and cells attached to work sites achieve two objectives: The work camps destroy black family and community life, a presumed source of resistance, and attempt to create human automatons whose purpose is to serve the South African state's drive toward wealth and hegemony. Like other fascist regimes, South Africa disallows any democratic rights to black people; they are denied the right to vote, to dissent, to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and to political representation. The regime has all the typical Nazi-like political apparatus: house arrests of dissenters such as Winnie Mandela; prison murder of protestors such as Stephen Biko; penal colonies such as Robbin Island. Black people, especially children, are routinely arrested without cause, detained without limits, and confronted with the economic and social disparities of a nation built around racial separation. Legally and economically, South African apartheid is structural and institutionalized racial war. The Organization of African Unity's regional intergovernmental meeting in 1984 in Tanzania was called to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. The meeting considered South Africa's racist apartheid regime a peace issue. The "regime is an affront to the dignity of all Africans on the continent and a stark reminder of the absence of equality and peace, representing the worst form of institutionalized oppression and strife." Pacifists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi who have used nonviolent resistance charged that those who used violence to obtain justice were just as evil as their oppressors. Yet all successful revolutionary movements have used organized violence. This is especially true of national liberation movements that have obtained state power and reorganized the institutions of their nations for the benefit of the people. If men and women in South Africa do not use organized violence, they could remain in the permanent violent state of the slave. Could it be that pacifism and nonviolence cannot become a way of life for the oppressed? Are they only tactics with specific and limited use for protecting people from further violence? For most people in the developing communities and the developing world consistent nonviolence is a luxury; it presumes that those who have and use nonviolent weapons will refrain from using them long enough for nonviolent resisters to win political battles. To survive, peoples in developing countries must use a varied repertoire of issues, tactics, and approaches. Sometimes arms are needed to defeat apartheid and defend freedom in South Africa; sometimes nonviolent demonstrations for justice are the appropriate strategy for protesting the shooting of black teenagers by a white man, such as happened in New York City. Peace is not merely an absence of 'conflict that enables white middleclass comfort**,** nor is it simply resistance to nuclear war and war machinery**.** The litany of "you will be blown up, too"directed by a white man to a black woman obscures the permanency and institutionalization of war, the violence and holocaust that people of color face daily. Unfortunately, the holocaust does not only refer to the mass murder of Jews, Christians, and atheists during the Nazi regime; it also refers to the permanent institutionalization of war that is part of every fascist and racist regime. The holocaust lives. It is a threat to world peace as pervasive and thorough as nuclear war.

## A2 State Bad

#### Debate should be teaching us to infiltrate —universalist prescriptions that isolate ourselves from the institutions that exercise power militates against revolutionary movements—becoming acquainted with the methods of the government is specifically key to develop tactics and strategies for bringing about the end of the world

Williams 69**[[10]](#footnote-10)**

INFILTRATE THE MANS INSTITUTIONS: Black youth should not commit the catastrophic error of seeing things simply in black and white. That is, of seeing things as all good or all bad. It is erroneous to think that one can isolate oneself completely from the institutions of a social and political system that exercises power over the environment in which he resides.Self-imposed and pre- mature isolation, initiated by the oppressed against the organs of a tyrannical establishment, militates against revolutionary movements dedicated to radical change**.** It is a grave error for militant and just-minded youth to reject struggle-serving opportunities to join the mans government services, police forces, armed forces, peace corps and vital organs of the power structure. Militants should become acquainted with the methods of the oppressor. Meaningful change can be more thoroughly effectuated by militant pressure from within as well as without. We can obtain invaluable know-how from the oppressor.Struggle is not all violence**.** Effective struggle requires tactics, plans, analysis and a highly sophisti- cated application of mental aptness. The forces of oppression and tyranny have perfected a highly articulate system of infiltration for undermining and frustrating the efforts of the oppressed in trying to upset the unjust status quo. To a great extent, the power structure keeps itself informed as to the revolutionary activity of freedom fighters. With the threat of extermination looming menacingly before Black Americans, it is pressingly imperative that our people enter the vital organs of the establishment. FIGHT KANGAROOISM: Inasmuch as the kangaroo court system constitutes a powerful defense arm of tyranny**,** extensive and vigorous educational work must be done among our people so that when they serve on jury duty they will not become tools of a legal system dedicated to railroading our people to concentration camps disguised as prisons. **The** kangaroo court system is being widely used to rid racist America of black militants, non-conformists and effective ghetto leadership**.** These so-called courts are not protecting the human and civil rights of our people**;** they are not dispensing even-handed justice, but are long-standing instruments of terror and intimidation. Black Americans must be inspired to display the same determination in safeguarding the human and civil rights of our oppressed people as white racists are to legally lynch us. No matter how much rigmarole is dished out about black capitalism and minority enterprise, the hard cold fact remains that it is as difficult for a Black American militant to receive justice in America's tyrannical courts as it is for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. Black people must be brought to see their duty as jurors as an opportunity to right legal wrongs not to perpetrate shameful obeisance to tyranny and racism.Youth should mount a campaign relative to this social evil that will by far ex- ceed the campaign of voter registration.

#### This debate should center around institutions—micro politics crushes real changes and cedes the political

Themba Nixon 2K

In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. Wehave to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalledby conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it

# Overview

#### Extend Butler 01 – The condition of ethics is a system of recognition – subjectivity is created in response to our relations with others.

#### Extend Butler 2 – Power relations in social frames affect the specific form that recognition takes, but recognition is a prerequisite to any normative system regardless of the distribution of power. Only the aff explains the kritik

#### This means that in order to generate obligations about what an agent ought to do, you need to take recognition into account - Absent a conception of recognition in Kritiks, reject the K because it doesn’t account for how agents move within the power relations that it critiques, so it can’t generate power relations.

#### And, extend Butler 09 – The value of a life depends on its grievability, its ability to be mourned – Some lives are excluded from these systems of recognition which leaves them vulnerable to the violence of social exclusion.

**Extend Endres 09** says the policy of the aff is key to shatter our current paradigms of recognition – but viewing indigenous lives as infinitely valuable through affirming indigenous lives through our spheres of recognition.

# \*\*\* Frontlines \*\*\*

# A2 Ks

## General K Overview

## A2 Deleuze

#### Extend Butler 01 – The condition of ethics is a system of recognition – subjectivity is created in response to our relations with others. These relationships of recognition are governed by norms that precede any individual subject and condition how subjects interact with each other.

#### This takes out the NC – Universal truths that are applied to specific situations don’t account for recognition because they attempt to generate rules before an event has happened and apply it after the event it has occurred, but ethical obligations only exist in relations to others.

1st – need recognition and cannot escape it – even the alternative relies on some form of recognition – That’s butler 2

b. framework doesn’t actually link – we don’t say static notion s

c.

Turn – understanding identity as fluid prevents us from every analyzing structures of power because

shifting of recognition can shift

#### Intelligability may cause ontological harm, but you can only generate obligations as to what agents should do if you understand yourself and others as a subject so we should accept the harms of recognition because without recognition there is no way to take actions because obligations take the form of agent x ought to do y. – ie the only way we can actually generate oligations or know what to do is if u understand urself and others

#### In order to generate obligations about what an agent ought to do, you have to acknowledge the importance of recognition because under any distribution of power, recognition determines obligations to other. Absent a conception of recognition in Kritiks, reject the K because it doesn’t account for how agents move within the power relations that it critiques, so it can’t generate power relations.

And, nuclear development relies upon the rhetorical exclusion and non recognition of the demands of marginalized communities. **Endres 09[[11]](#footnote-11)**

## A2 Wilderson

## A2 Tuck and Yang

## A2 Cap

## A2 Fem

## A2 Wynters

## A2 Antiethics

## A2 GBTL

# A2 CPs

## General CP Overview

## A2 Gen IV

#### CP can’t solve aff – too complicated to develop and will take years to make. Many DAs and no solvency Lovins 09[[12]](#footnote-12)

The dominant type of new nuclear power plant, light-water reactors (LWRs), proved unfinanceable in the robust 2005–08 capital market, despite new U.S. subsidies approaching or exceeding their total construction cost. New LWRs are now so costly and slow unsound for any nuclear reactor.Integrated Fast Reactors (IFRs) The IFR—a pool-type, liquid-sodium-cooled fast- neutron reactor plus an ambitious new nuclear fuel cycle—was abandoned in 1994, and General Electric’s S-PRISM design in ~2003, due to both proliferation concerns and dismal economics. Federal funding for fast breeder reactors halted in 1983, but in the past few years, enthusiasts got renewed Bush Administration support by portraying IFRs as a solution to proliferation and nuclear waste. It’s neither. **Fast reactors were** first **offered** as a way **to make more plutonium** to augment and ultimately replace scarce uranium. **Now that uranium and enrichment are known to get cheaper** while reprocessing, cleanup, and nonproliferation get costlier—**destroying the economic rationale— IFRs have been rebranded as a way to destroy the plutonium** (and similar transuranic elements) **in** long-lived radioactive **waste**. Two or three redesigned IFRs could in principle fission the plutonium produced by each four LWRs without making more net plutonium. However, **most LWRs will have retired before even one commercial-size IFR could be built; LWRs won’t be replaced with more** LWRs **because they’re** grossly **uncompetitive; and IFRs with their fuel cycle would cost even more and** probably **be less reliable**. It’s feasible today to “burn” plutonium in LWRs, but this isn’t done much because it’s very hotter, enhances risks, and makes certain transuranic isotopes that complicate operation. **IFRs** could **do the same thing with** similar or **greater problems, offering no advantage over LWRs in proliferation resistance, cost, or environment. IFRs’** reprocessing plant, lately rebranded a “recycling center,” would be built at or near the reactors, coupling them so neither works without the other. Its novel **technology, replacing solvents** and aqueous chemistry **with high-temperature pyrometallurgy and electrorefining, would incur different but major challenges, greater technical risks and repair problems, and speculative but probably worse economics.** (Argonne National Laboratory, the world’s experts on it, contracted to pyroprocess spent fuel from EBR-II—a small IFR-like test reactor shut down in 1994— **Reprocessing** of any kind makes waste management more difficult and complex, **increases the volume** and diversity **of waste** streams, **increases** by several- to manyfold **the cost of** nuclear **fueling, and separates bomb-usable material** that can’t be adequately measured or protected. Mainly for this last reason, all Presidents since Gerald Ford in 1976 (except G.W. Bush in 2006– 08) discouraged it. **An IFR**/pyroprocessing **system would give any country** immediate **access to over a thousand bombs’ worth of plutonium to fuel it, facilities to recover that plutonium, and experts to separate and fabricate it into bomb cores**—hardly a path to a safer world. **IFRs** might in principle offer some safety advantages over today’s light-water reactors, but **create different safety concerns, including the sodium coolant’s** chemical reactivity and **radioactivity**. Over the past half-century, the world’s leading nuclear technologists have built about three dozen sodium-cooled fast reactors, 11 of them Naval. Of the 22 whose histories – -use. As this becomes evident, other kinds that they save 2– of reactors are being proposed instead—novel designs claimed to solve LWRs’ problems of economics, proliferation, and waste. Even climate-protection pioneer Jim Hansen says these “Gen IV” reactors merit rapid R&D. But on closer examination, the two kinds most often promoted—**Integral Fast Reactors** (IFRs) and thorium reactors—**reveal no economic, environmental, or security rationale, and the thesis is are mostly reported, over half had sodium leaks, four suffered fuel damage** (including two partial meltdowns), **several others had serious accidents, most were prematurely closed**, and only six succeeded. Admiral **Rickover canceled sodium-cooled propulsion** for USS Seawolf in 1956 **as “expensive** to build**,** **complex** to operate**,** **susceptible to prolonged shutdown as a result of** even **minor malfunctions, and difficult and time-consuming to repair.”** Little has changed. As Dr. Tom Cochran of NRDC notes, **fast reactor programs were tried in the US, UK, France,** **Germany, Italy, Japan, the USSR, and the US and Soviet Navies. All failed**. After a half-century and tens of billions of dollars, the **world has one operational commercial-sized fast reactor** (Russia’s BN600) out of 438 commercial power reactors, **and it’s not fueled with plutonium. IFRs are often claimed to “burn up nuclear waste”** and make its “time of concern...less than 500 years” rather than 10,000– 100,000 years or more. **That’s wrong: most of the radioactivity comes from fission products, including** very-**long-lived isotopes** like iodine-129 and technicium-99, **and their mix is** broadly **similar in any nuclear fuel cycle. IFRs’ wastes may contain less transuranics, but at prohibitive cost and with worse occupational exposures, routine releases, accident and terrorism risks, proliferation, and disposal needs for intermediate- and low-level wastes.** It’s simply a dishonest fantasy to claim, as a Wall Street Journal op-ed just did, that such hypothe-tical and uneconomic ways to recover energy or other value from spent LWR fuel mean “There is no such thing as nuclear waste.” Of course, the nuclear industry wishes this were true. No new kind of reactor is likely to be much, if at all, cheaper than today’s LWRs, which remain grossly uncompetitive and are getting more so despite five decades of maturation. “New reactors” are precisely the “paper reactors” Admiral Rickover described in 1953: An academic reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) It is simple. (2) It is small. (3) It is cheap. (4) It is light. (5) It can be built very quickly. (6) It is very flexible in purpose. (7) Very little development will be required. It will use off-the-shelf components. (8) The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now. On the other hand a practical reactor can be distinguished by the following characteristics: (1) It is being built now. (2) It is behind schedule. (3) It requires an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. (4) It is very expensive. (5) It takes a long time to build because of its engineering development problems. (6) It is large. (7) It is heavy. (8) It is complicated. **Every new type of reactor in history has been costlier, slower, and harder than projected. IFRs’** low pres¬sure, different safety profile, high temperature, and potentially higher thermal efficiency (if its helium turbines didn’t misbehave as they have in all previous reactor projects) **come with countervailing disadvantages and costs that advocates assume away, contrary to all experience.**

## A2 Thorium Reactors

#### Efficient renewables solve better than thorium reactors, without cost, prolif and waste risks Lovins 09[[13]](#footnote-13)

Some enthusiasts prefer fueling reactors with thorium—an element still as abundant as uranium but even more uneconomic to use. India has for decades failed to commercialize breeder reactors to exploit its thorium deposits. But **thorium can’t fuel a reactor by itself**: **rather, a uranium- or plutonium-fueled reactor can convert thorium- 232 into** fissionable (and **plutonium-like, highly bomb-usable**) **uranium**-**233.** **Thorium’s proliferation, waste, safety, and cost problems differ only in detail from uranium’s**: e.g., thorium ore makes less mill waste, but highly radioactive U-232 makes fabricating or reprocessing U-233 fuel hard and costly. And with uranium-based nuclear power continuing its decades-long economic collapse, it’s awfully late to be thinking of developing a whole new fuel cycle whose problems differ only in detail from current versions. Spent LWR fuel “burned” in IFRs, it’s claimed, could meet all humanity’s energy needs for centuries. But **renewables and efficiency can do that forever at far lower cost, with no proliferation, nuclear wastes, or major risks**. Moreover, **any new type of reactor would probably cost even more than today’s models: even if the nuclear part of a new plant were free, the rest—two-thirds of its capital cost—would still be grossly uncompetitive with any efficiency and most renewables, sending out a kilowatt-hour for ~9–13¢/kWh instead of new LWRs’ ~12–18+¢.** In contrast, **the average U.S. windfarm completed in 2007 sold its power** (net of a 1¢/kWh subsidy that’s a small fraction of nuclear subsidies) **for 4.5¢/kWh. Add ~0.4¢ to make it dispatchable whether the wind is blowing or not and you get under a nickel delivered to the grid. Most** other **renewables also beat new thermal power plants too, cogeneration is often comparable or cheaper, and efficiency is cheaper than just running any nuclear- or fossil-fueled plant**. Obviously **these options would also easily beat proposed fusion reactors that are sometimes claimed to be comparable to today’s fission reactors in size and cost. And unlike any kind of hypothetical** fusion or **new** fission **reactor**—**or LWRs, which have a market share below 2%—efficiency and micropower now provide at least half the world’s new electrical services, adding tens of times more capacity each year than nuclear power does.** It’s a far bigger gamble to assume that the nuclear market loser will become a winner than that these winners will turn to losers.

# A2 DAs

## A2 Coal DA

### A2 Link

#### Turn – Germany’s nuclear ban will accelerate tech breakthroughs in renewables; it will be a global leader

**Korosec 11[[14]](#footnote-14)**

Renewable markets Germany is already a world leader in renewable energy. Today, renewable energy provides about 13 percent of Germany's power. **By 2020, it wants renewable sources to provide 35 percent of its electricity.** To be clear, it will take a massive effort to reach that goal. And **the global stakes are high. If Germany is successful, other countries have follow its lead.** If it fails, governments that have been slow to embrace renewable energy will use Germany's problems as a reason to backpedal from the source altogether. **To reach that goal, there will have to be breakthroughs in solar as well as storage technology. The nuclear ban could very well accelerate these kinds of breakthroughs. More companies, recognizing the opportunity, will enter the market and existing renewable energy businesses will expand.**

#### Turn – a nuclear ban causes a shift to renewables, France proves

**Agnihotri 15[[15]](#footnote-15)**

France is the world’s most nuclear dependent country. With 58 nuclear reactors in 19 power stations having a total capacity of 63.2 gigawatts, France is the second largest producer of nuclear energy in the world, second only to the United States. But unlike the U.S., nuclear energy represents France’s largest source of electricity generation, accounting for around 77 percent of the country’s energy generation in 2014. However, in the last few years, **France** **has** witnessed growing **public support in favor of developing newer tech**nologies **that can reduce carbon emissions and replace nuclear power**. In the year 2012, France’s newly elected President Francois Hollande **pledge**d **to reduce** his country’s **dependence on nuclear power** to 50 percent by 2025. This **triggered a ‘national debate for energy transition’** in France which lasted for eight months. **The National Assembly** of France **then passed a**n Energy Transition for Green Growth **bill** in 2014 **which** would **put a cap[ped] on the country’s nuclear power** capacity at the current level of 63.2 gigawatts. Related: Top 6 Most Powerful Women In Oil And Gas How will France meet this tough new target? Last week saw French Lawmakers finally pass this bill which seeks to cut the country’s growing dependence on nuclear power. With the move, France is following Germany, which decided to significantly reduce its dependence on nuclear energy after the infamous 2011- Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. In order to meet this tough new target, Electricite De France or EDF (which is 85 percent government-owned) would have no other option but to close some of its nuclear power capacity in order to accommodate its new European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), which is currently under construction in Normandy. **The** new **law** further **requires France to increase** **the contribution of** **renewables in its total energy consumption to 32 percent by 2030**. This is in addition to reducing the C02 emissions by 40 percent by 2030 when compared to 1990 levels and also reduce conventional fossil fuel consumption by 30 percent by 2030 from 2012 levels. Although the law has made it quite clear that France now has to reduce its dependence on nuclear power, there are still several loopholes, as it hasn’t provided a clear manner in which the set target is supposed to be met and there is no specific implementation strategy put in place yet. “This law sets goals, which is interesting, but it doesn't explain how to reach them, postponement of the detailed implementation plans is not a good sign," said Yannick Rousselet of Greenpeace. Can we expect massive investments in renewables and natural gas? “I want France to become a nation of environmental excellence,” said French environmental minister Segolene Royal. She further said that recent **steps** taken by the French government **could create** close to **100,000 jobs** in the renewable sector. As **the new law has** also **set a goal of increasing overall renewable energy consumption while also curtailing nuclear power, we can expect** some **major foreign investments** in the French clean energy sector in the coming few years.French **energy giant Total has** in fact **been investing a substantial amount in** the **solar** sector**.** With its partnership with U.S. based Sunpower, Total might just ramp up its investments in the French solar sector. It is interesting to note that **wind energy also enjoys local public support** in France as a 2014-CSA survey revealed that around 64 percent of local people see wind energy **as a worthy replacement for nuclear power**. According to the European Wind Energy Association, France increased its target for energy generation from wind to 19 gigawatts by 2020 from 8.2 gigawatts in 2014. France is also the second largest producer of biofuels in Europe after Germany, mostly producing biodiesel. France has already set a goal of blending 10 percent of biofuels with its conventional fuels by 2020. So, with the current push towards renewables one can reasonably expect a surge in biofuel investments as well. However, the same cannot be said for natural gas, as France is one of the four countries that have banned hydraulic fracturing or fracking. **Experts predict that the French natural gas demand might even fall by the year 2020**. What does this mean for the suppliers of nuclear fuel and companies like AREVA? France‘s decision to reduce dependence on nuclear power will not go down well with the already struggling nuclear industry, which includes French players like Areva, EDF and GDF Suez. Areva, the world’s largest nuclear company, reported a loss of $4.8 billion in 2014 after it started facing a dip in demand following the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Areva is one of the most prominent companies in France, so the French government has been trying hard to save the company through a proposed deal with EDF, which involves selling off its reactor and fuel treatment business. According to recent reports, the French government could end up shelling out $5.5 billion to rescue Areva, far more than anticipated. **With its desire to shift away from nuclear energy, France is** slowly and steadily **preparing itself to adapt newer technologies** and eventually move towards renewables. However, **this transition requires** a clear road map with a clear plan on the systematic **closure of its nuclear capacity.** Without these, it might take several years (beyond the target dates) for the Energy Transition law to get implemented.

#### Renewables are expanding far faster than nuclear

**Schneider et al 11[[16]](#footnote-16)**

China in particular has become the global leader for new capacity in both nuclear and wind power. Forty percent of all reactors under construction are **in China**. The extent to which both technologies are expected to grow is unparalleled, although **the installed capacity for wind power**, at roughly 45 GW, **is** currently **more than four times that for nuclear** (roughly 10 GW).23 (See Figure 14.) Even with a 3–4 times lower load factor, **wind** is likely to **produce more electricity** in China **in 2011 than nuclear**. China’s **wind power growth is so dramatic that the country must continually raise its production targets, as they are repeatedly being met prematurely**.24 China is not only a major implementer of wind technologies, but a global player in related manufacturing. **In India**, meanwhile, **wind generation outpaced nuclear power** already in 2009, according to data from the U.S. Department of Energy.25 In the United States, no new nuclear capacity has been added since the Watts Bar-2 reactor in Tennessee was commissioned in 1996, after 23 years of construction. Meanwhile, **the share of renewables in newly added U.S. electricity capacity jumped from 2 percent in** 20**04 to 55 percent in** 20**09**.26 And although Germany provisionally shut down seven of its reactors after the Fukushima disaster, if the remaining 10 units generate a similar amount of electricity as they did in 2010, then in 2011 for the first time ever **renewable energy will produce more** of the country’s **power than nuclear**. **Four German states generated more than 40 percent of their electricity from wind turbines alone already** in 2010.27 An analysis by the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) shows that **while more than 100 GW of wind and solar were added to the EU power grid between 2000 and 2010, nuclear generation declined by 7.6 GW**, **joining the rapidly declining trend of coal- and oil-fired power plants**. (See Figure 15.)

#### Nuclear power can’t solve warming – it would require one reactor a week for 52 years

**Caldicott 6[[17]](#footnote-17)**

Setting aside the energetic costs of the whole fuel cycle, and looking just at the Nuclear Industry's claim that what transpires in the nuclear plants is **"clean and green," the following conditions would have to be met for nuclear power actually to make the substantial contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions that the industry claims is possible** (this analysis assumes 2% or more growth in global electricity demand): **•All present-day nuclear power plants**-441-**would have to be replaced by new ones**. **•Half the electricity growth would have to be provided by nuclear power. •Half of all the world's coal fired plants would have to be replaced by nuclear power plants**.28 **This would mean the construction over the next fifty years of some 2,000 to 3,000 nuclear reactors** of 1,000 megawatt size-**one per week for fifty years! Considering the eight to ten years it takes to construct a new reactor and the finite supply of uranium fuel, such an enterprise is simply not viable.**

#### Nuclear power plant construction and uranium mining emits as much carbon as a natural gas plant.

**Sovacool 07[[18]](#footnote-18)**

Third and finally, **nuclear power plants are not carbon neutral. The Oxford Research Group concludes that the nuclear fuel cycle is responsible for emitting** 84 to **122 grams of carbon dioxide per every kWh**, mostly from uranium mining, plant construction, and plant decommissioning. The report also notes that **these emissions are around half of that as natural gas plants** (so we are talking about some serious carbon). In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency notes that **uranium is getting harder to mine, meaning that the carbon emissions related to nuclear will get worse as more uranium gets depleted, not better**. This is because **mining uranium ores of relatively low grades and greater depth is much more energy intensive**. If world nuclear generating share remains what it is today, the Oxford Research Group concludes that **by 2050 nuclear power would generate as much carbon dioxide per kWh as a comparable gas- fired power station**.

#### Nuclear power produces no net energy—the difficulty of uranium extraction means CO2 emissions are the same

**Caldicott 6[[19]](#footnote-19)**

**While currently the creation of nuclear electricity emits only one-third the amount of CO**2 **emitted from a similar-sized, conventional gas generator, this is a transitory statistic**. Over several decades, **as the concentration of available uranium ore declines, more fossil fuels will be required to extract the ore from less concentrated ore veins**. **Within ten to twenty years, nuclear reac- tors will produce no net energy because of the massive amounts of fossil fuel that will be necessary to mine and to enrich the remaining poor grades of uranium.** (The nuclear power industry contends that large quantities of uranium can be obtained by .reprocessing radioactive spent fuel. However, this process is extremely expen sive; medically dangerous for nuclear workers, and releases large amounts of radioactive material into the air and water; it is therefore not a pragmatic consideration.) By extension, **the operation of nuclear power plants will then produce exactly the same amounts of greenhouse gases and air pollution as standard power plants.** Contrary to the nuclear industry claims, smoothly running nuclear power plants are also not emission free. Government regulations allow nuclear plants "routinely" to emit hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive gases and other radioactive ele ments into the environment every year.

### A2 Impact

**Warming inevitable – brink has passed.**

Rood 14**[[20]](#footnote-20)**

Earth’s climate is changing rapidly. We know this from billions of observations, documented in thousands of journal papers and texts and summarized every few years by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The primary cause of that change is the release of carbon dioxide from burning coal, oil and natural gas. International climate talks in Lima this week are laying the foundation for next year’s UN climate summit in Paris. While negotiations about reducing emissions grind on, how much warming are we already locked into? If we stop emitting greenhouse gases tomorrow, why would the temperature continue to rise? The carbon dioxide that accumulates in the atmosphere insulates the surface of the Earth. It’s like a warming blanket that holds in heat. This energy increases the Earth’s surface average temperature, heats the oceans and melts polar ice. As consequences, sea level rises and weather changes. Global average temperature has increased. Anomalies are relative to the mean temperature of 1961-1990. Finnish Meteorological Institute and Finnish Ministry of the Environment, Author provided Since 1880, after carbon dioxide emissions took off with the Industrial Revolution, the average global temperature has increased about 1.5F (0.85C). Each of the last three decades has been warmer than the preceding decade, as well as warmer than the entire previous century. The Arctic is warming much faster than the average global temperature; ice in the Arctic Ocean is melting and the permafrost is thawing. Ice sheets in both the Arctic and Antarctic are melting. Ecosystems on both land and in the sea are changing. The observed changes are coherent and consistent with our theoretical understanding of the Earth’s energy balance and simulations from models that are used to understand past variability and to help us think about the future. What would happen to the climate if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide today, right now? Would we return to the climate of our elders? The simple answer is no. Once we release the carbon dioxide stored in the fossil fuels we burn, it accumulates in and moves amongst the atmosphere, the oceans, the land, and the plants and animals of the biosphere. The released carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years. Only after many millennia will it return to rocks, for example, through the formation of calcium carbonate – limestone – as marine organisms' shells settle to the bottom of the ocean. But on time spans relevant to humans, once released the carbon dioxide is in our environment essentially forever. It does not go away, unless we, ourselves, remove it. If we stop emitting today, it’s not the end of the story for global warming. There’s a delay in temperature increase as the climate catches up with all the carbon that’s in the atmosphere. After maybe 40 more years, the climate will stabilize at a temperature higher than what was normal for previous generations. This decades-long lag between cause and effect is due to the long time it takes to heat the the ocean’s huge mass. The energy that is held at the Earth by the increased carbon dioxide does more than heat the air. It melts ice; it heats the ocean. Compared to air, it’s harder to raise the temperature of water – it takes time, decades. However, once the ocean temperature is elevated, it adds to the warming of the Earth’s surface. So even if carbon emissions stopped completely right now, as the oceans catch up with the atmosphere, the Earth’s temperature would rise about another 1.1F (0.6C). Scientists refer to this as committed warming. Ice, also responding to increasing heat in the ocean, will continue to melt. There’s already convincing evidence that significant glaciers in the West Antarctic ice sheets are lost. Ice, water, and air – the extra heat held on the Earth by carbon dioxide affects them all. That which has melted will stay melted – and more will melt. Ecosystems are altered by natural and manmade occurrences. As they recover, it will be in a different climate from that in which they evolved. The climate in which they recover will not be stable; it will be continuing to warm. There will be no new normal, only more change.

# Other Cards

#### And, Before we can answer normative questions, we need to first understand counts as a subject in our moral sphere.

**Butler 09[[21]](#footnote-21)**

In a recent exchange, 1 the British sociologist Chetan Bhatt remarked that "in sociology, cultural theory or cultural studies, many of us assume a field of truths ... a (albeit contested) field of theoretical intelligibility for understanding or describing 'Self', 'Other', the subject, identity, culture."2 He adds: "I am no longer sure these concepts necessarily have the expansive capacity to speak to the massive transformations of life-worlds outside Euro America, the rapid unscrambling and repackaging of what we call 'identity' ... " If Bhatt is right, then **the very framework by which we proceed**, whether that of multiculturalism or human rights, **presumes specific kinds of subjects that may or may not correspond to the modes of life in play within the present time**. The subjects presumed by the liberal and multicultural frameworks (and we will have to try to distinguish between them) are characterized as belonging to certain kinds of cultural identities, variously conceived as singularly or multiply determined by lists of categories that include ethnicity, class, race, religion, sexuality, and gender. **There are persistent questions about whether and how such subjects can be represented in law, and what might count as sufficient cultural and institutional recognition for such subjects**. **We ask such normative questions as if we know what we mean by the subject even as we do not always know how best to represent or recognize various subjects**. Indeed, **the "we" who asks such questions** for the most part **assumes that the problem is a normative one**, namely, how best to arrange political life so that recognition and representation can take place. And though surely this is a crucial, if not the most crucial, normative question to ask, **we cannot possibly approach an answer if we do not consider the ontology of the subject whose recognition and representation is at issue**. Moreover, **any inquiry into that ontology requires that we consider another level at which the normative operates, namely, through norms that produce the idea of the human who is worthy of recognition and representation at all.** That is to say, **we cannot** ask and **answer** **the** more commonly understood **normative question**, regarding how best to represent or to recognize such subjects, **if we fail to understand the differential of power at work that distinguishes between those subjects who will be eligible for recognition and those who will not**. In other words, **what is the norm according to which the subject is produced who then becomes the presumptive "ground" of normative debate?** **The problem is not merely** or only "**ontological**" **since the forms the subject takes** as well as the life-worlds that **do not conform to available categories of the subject** emerge in light of historical and geopolitical movements.

#### And, making lives grievable requires interrupting current frames of recognition controlled by the government – it means recognizing the value in the lives of those who currently aren’t seem as worthy.

**Butler 09[[22]](#footnote-22)**

So, one way of posing the question of who "we" are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. **An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because** it has never lived, that is, **it has never counted as a life at all**. **We can see the division** of the globe **into grievable and ungrievable lives from** the perspective of **those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities**, and to defend them against the lives of others-even if it means taking those latter lives. After the attacks of 9/11, we encountered in the media graphic pictures of those who died, along with their names, their stories, the reactions of their families. Public grieving was dedicated to making these images iconic for the nation, which meant of course that there was considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers. **The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous significance**. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the sovereign law to do so. **Why is it that governments so often seek to regulate and control who will be publicly grievable and who will not**? In the initial years of the AIDS crisis in the US, the public vigils, and the Names Projece broke through the public shame associated with dying from AIDS, a shame associated sometimes with homosexuality, and especially anal sex, and sometimes with drugs and promiscuity. It meant something to state and show the name, to put together some remnants of a life, to publicly display and avow the loss. What would happen if those killed in the current wars were to be grieved in just such an open way? **Why is it that we are not given the names of all the war dead, including those the US has killed, of whom we will never have the image, the name, the story, never a testimonial shard of their life, something to see, to touch, to know**? Although it is not possible to singularize every life destroyed in war, there are surely ways to register the populations injured and destroyed without fully assimilating to the iconic function of the image. 4 **Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage** in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss **has enormous political potential**. It is, after all, one of the reasons Plato wanted to ban the poets from the Republic. He thought that if the citizens went too often to watch tragedy, they would weep over the losses they saw, and that such open and public mourning, in disrupting the order and hierarchy of the soul, would disrupt the order and hierarchy of political authority as well. Whether we are speaking about open grief or outrage, we are talking about **affective responses** that **are highly regulated by regimes of power** and sometimes subject to explicit censorship. In the contemporary wars in which the US is directly engaged, those in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can see how affect is regulated to support both the war effort and, more specifically, nationalist belonging. **When the photos of Abu Ghraib were** first **released** in the US,conservative **television pundits argued that it would be unAmerican to show them**. We were not supposed to have graphic evidence of the acts of torture US personnel had committed. **We were not supposed to know that the US had violated internationally recognized human rights**. It was un-American to show these photos and un-American to glean information from them as to how the war was being conducted. The conservative political commentator Bill O'Reilly thought that the photos would create a negative image of the US and that we had an obligation to defend a positive image. 5 Donald Rumsfeld said something similar, suggesting that it was anti-American to display the photos. 6 Of course, neither considered that the American public might have a right to know about the activities of its military, or that the public's right to judge the war on the basis of full evidence is part of the democratic tradition of participation and deliberation. So what was really being said? It seems to me that **those who sought to limit the power of the image** in this instance also **sought to limit the power of affect**, of outrage, **knowing** full well **that it** could and **would turn public opinion against the war** in Iraq, as indeed it did. **The question**, though, **of whose lives are** to be **regarded as grievable**, as worthy of protection, as belonging to subjects with rights that ought to be honored, **returns us to the question of how affect is regulated** and of what we mean by the regulation of affect at all. The anthropologist Talal Asad recently wrote a book about suicide bombing in which the first question he poses is: Why do we feel horror and moral repulsion in the face of suicide bombing when we do not always feel the same way in the face of statesponsored violence?7 He asks the question not in order to say that these forms of violence are the same, or even to say that we ought to feel the same moral outrage in relation to both. But he finds it curious, and I follow him here, that **our moral responses**-responses that first take form as affect-**are** tacitly **regulated by** certain kinds of **interpretive frameworks**. His thesis is that **we feel more horror and moral revulsion in the face of lives lost under certain conditions than under** certain **others.** If, for instance, someone kills or is killed in war, and the war is state-sponsored, and we invest the state with legitimacy, then we consider the death lamentable, sad, and unfortunate, but not radically unjust. And yet if the violence is perpetrated by insurgency groups regarded as illegitimate, then our affect invariably changes, or so Asad assumes. Although Asad asks us to think about suicide bombing - something I won't do right now-it is also clear that he is saying something important about the politics of moral responsiveness; namely, that **what we feel is** in part **conditioned by how we interpret the world** around us; that how we interpret what we feel actually can and does alter the feeling itself. If we accept that affect is structured by interpretive schemes that we do not fully understand, can this help us understand why it is we might feel horror in the face of certain losses but indifference or even righteousness in light of others? In contemporary conditions of war and heightened nationalism, we imagine that our existence is bound up with others with whom we can find national affinity, who are recognizable to us, and who conform to certain culturally specific notions about what the culturally recognizable human is. **This interpretative framework functions by** tacitly **differentiating between those populations on whom** my life and **existence depend, and those** populations **who represent a direct threat to** my life and **existence**. **When a population appears as a** direct **threat** to my life, **they do not appear as "lives,"** but as the threat to life (a living figure that figures the threat to life). Consider how this is compounded under those conditions in which Islam is seen as barbaric or pre-modem, as not yet having conformed to those norms that make the human recognizable. **Those we kill are** not quite human, and **not quite alive, which means that we do not feel the same horror** and outrage **over the loss of their lives as we do over the loss of those lives that bear** national or religious **similarity to our own**.

**Butler 09[[23]](#footnote-23)**

**One might**, for instance, **believe in the sanctity of life** or adhere to a general philosophy that opposes violent action of all kinds against sentient beings, and one might invest powerful feelings in such a belief. **But** **if** **certain lives are not perceivable as** **lives**, and this includes sentient beings who are not human, **then the moral prohibition against violence will be only selectively applied** (and our own sentience will be only selectively mobilized). The **critique** of violence **must begin with the question of the representability of life itself**: **what allows a life to become visible in its precariousness** and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or understanding certain lives in this way? The problem concerns the media, at the most general level, since **a life can be accorded a value only on the condition that it is perceivable as a life**, **but it is only on the condition of certain embedded evaluative structures that a life becomes perceivable at all**. To perceive a life is not quite the same as encountering a life as precarious. Encountering a life as precarious is not a raw encounter, one in which life is stripped bare of all its usual interpretations, appearing to us outside all relations of power. An ethical attitude does not spontaneously arrive as soon as the usual interpretive frameworks are destroyed, and no pure moral conscience emerges once the shackles of everyday interpretation have been thrown off. On the contrary, **it is only by challenging the dominant media that certain** kinds of **lives** may **become** visible or **knowable in their precariousness**. **It is not only** or exclusively **the visual apprehension** of a life that forms a necessary precondition for an understanding of the precariousness of life. Another **life is taken in through all the senses**, if it is taken in at all. **The** tacit **interpretive scheme that divides worthy from unworthy lives works** fundamentally **through the senses, differentiating the cries we can hear from those we cannot, the sights we can see from those we cannot**, and likewise at the level of touch and even smell. War sustains its practices through acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively, deadening affect in response to certain images and sounds, and enlivening affective responses to others. This is why **war** works to undermine a sensate democracy, **restrict**ing **what we can feel, disposing us to feel** shock and **outrage in the face of one expression of violence and** righteous **coldness in the face of another**. **To encounter the precariousness of another life, the senses have to be operative, which means that a struggle must be waged against those forces that seek to regulate affect in differential ways. The point is** not to celebrate a full deregulation of affect, but **to query the conditions of responsiveness by offering interpretive matrices for the understanding of war that question and oppose the dominant interpretations**-interpretations that not only act upon affect, but take form and become effective as affect itself.

**Endres 09[[24]](#footnote-24)**

Considering the use of American Indian resources and lands in support of the nuclear production process, the discourse of nuclearism intersects with the discourse of colonialism to create the discourse of nuclear colonialism. Nuclearism is the assumption that nuclear weapons and nuclear power are crucial to the national interest and national security, serving to normalize and justify all aspects of the nuclear production process.37 Nuclearism is an ideology and a discursive system that is ‘‘intertextually configured by present discourses such as militarism, nationalism, bureaucracy, and technical-rationality.’’38 Even with the end of the Cold War, we still see nuclearism present in contemporary US policy such as the call to license new nuclear reactors for the first time in over twenty years and research into new nuclear weapons technology (e.g., bunker busters). Resistance to nuclearism comes in many forms, one of which is the body of scholarship called nuclear communication criticism. Within this corpus, Bryan Taylor and William Kinsella advocate the study of ‘‘nuclear legacies’’ of the nuclear production process.39 The material legacies of the nuclear production process include the deaths of Navajo uranium miners, the left-over uranium tailings on Navajo land, and Western Shoshone downwinders. However, nuclear waste is in need of more examination; as Taylor writes, ‘‘nuclear waste represents one of the most complex and highly charged controversies created by the postwar society. Perhaps daunted by its technical, legal and political complexities, communication scholars have not widely engaged this topic.’’40 One of the reasons that nuclear waste is such a complex controversy is its connection with nuclear colonialism. Nuclear communication criticism has focused on examination of the ‘‘practices and processes of communication’’ related to the nuclear production process and the legacies of this process.41 At least two themes in nuclear discourse are relevant to nuclear colonialism: 1) invocation of national interest; and 2) constraints to public debate. First, **nuclear discourse is married to** the **professed** **national interest, calling for the sacrifices among** the **communities** affected by the legacies of the nuclear production process.42 According to Kuletz, **the American West has been constructed as a ‘‘national sacrifice zone’’** because of its connection to the nuclear production process.43 Nuclearism is tautological in its basic assumption that nuclear production serves the national interest and national security and its use of national security and national interest to justify nuclearism. **The federal government justifies nuclear production**, which disproportionately takes place on American Indian land, **as serving** the **national security**. **This** justification works with the strategy of colonialism that **defines American Indian people as part of the nation and not as** separate, inherently **sovereign entities whose** national **interest may not include storing nuclear waste on their land.** A second theme in **nuclear discourse** is its ability to **constrain public debate through invoking the national interest, defining opponents as unpatriotic** and employing discursive containment.44 For instance, ‘‘**discursive containment often operates on the premise that public participation is a** potential **hazard to official interests and should be minimized** and controlled.’’45 The **strategies** of nuclear discourse **that constrain** public **debate work** in concert **with** strategies of **rhetorical colonialism that exclude and constrain the participation of American Indians in decisions affecting their land and resources.** Taken together, **the intersection of** the discourses of **colonialism and nuclearism** create a powerful discourse aimed at **perpetuat**ing **the nuclear production process for the benefit of the colonizer at the expense of their colonial targets.**

In addition to outlining a decision calculus that shifts the burden of proof in a way that makes it impossible to offer a counterargument that would outweigh the national interest, the site recommendation report also ignores American Indian arguments when it outlines and responds to the ‘‘principal arguments’’ against the site. The third strategy of nuclear colonialism\*strategic silence\*explains how indigenous voices can be suppressed in official documents. In Sanchez, Stuckey and Morris’ conception, rhetorical exclusion is expressed through specific defining practices that label American Indians as threatening and already guilty.74 However, I argue that rhetorical exclusion can also be achieved through the strategic use of silence. Strategic silence acts as a form of rhetorical exclusion when silence is used by a group with power over another group as a way to exclude their voices or arguments. This way of defining strategic silence is different from Robin Clair’s notion of silence as an act of resistance by marginalized groups.75 It is also different from Barry Brummett’s articulation of strategic silence as an unexpected response that rhetorically calls attention to the silence.76 The Yucca Mountain case reveals that strategic silence can also be used to continue the silencing of an already silenced group by drawing attention away from the silence. This form of strategic silence works best when there is general lack of understanding among the public about the issue or group being silenced. For example, using strategic silence to exclude American Indian arguments against the Yucca Mountain site is enabled by the colonizer’s version of history that emphasizes that American Indians were defeated and have all been assimilated into ‘‘American’’ culture. As stated by Derek Buescher and Kent Ono, ‘‘contemporary culture masks the continuing lived history of people disenfranchised by colonialism by failing to acknowledge colonialism’s presence in the US today.’’77 So, how does Abraham’s site authorization report employ a strategic silence to rhetorically exclude American Indian arguments? In a section titled, ‘‘None of the Arguments against Yucca Mountain Withstands Analysis,’’ Abraham identifies seven ‘‘principal counterarguments’’ against the site: The final question I examine is whether the arguments against its designation rise to a level that outweighs the case for going forward. I believe they do not, as I shall explain. I do so by briefly describing these principal arguments made by opponents of the Project, and then responding to them.79 However, American Indian arguments are not included in the list of seven principal arguments. This strategic silence excludes American Indian arguments regarding treaty rights and the necessity of government-to-government consultation. Abraham justifies strategic silence through other rhetorical choices in the document, namely of the use of the term ‘‘principal counterarguments.’’ Using the word ‘‘principal’’ provides a justification for the selection of counterarguments that will then, by implication, make other non-included arguments seem trivial or irrelevant. Yet the arguments listed by Abraham are not the most important. Rather, from the perspective of the federal government, they are the most easily addressed and most easily weighed against the national interest. American Indian arguments against the site, on the other hand, are the most difficult to address and provide some of the most important challenges to the project. Recall that nearly all the American Indian public comments addressed the violation of the Treaty of Ruby Valley by proposing a high-level waste site on Western Shoshone land. To respond to this argument would require not only that the federal government prove that they actually hold rights over the land (which I have shown above to be quite contested) but also that the federal government acknowledge American Indians as members of separate nations (which makes it difficult to dismiss their arguments in the name of US national interest). Because American Indian arguments raise issues of fairness, treaty rights, legal protection for use of sacred lands and the systemic colonization of American Indians, these arguments may act together as a significant challenge to the project. Indeed, there is great risk for the US in relinquishing the colonial system; ‘‘genuine recognition of indigenous peoples (colonized without consent) must involve a redistribution of both political power and resources, which terminates not only their economic and social subordination but also the colonial relationship itself.’’80 Thus, American Indian opposition to the site threatens the very nature of the power relationship between the US and American Indian nations. Strategic silence depends upon how the discourse of colonialism gives the impression that the Indian wars are over, that the US won, that American Indians are an interest group instead of sovereign nations and that American Indians have been assimilated into the melting pot of the US. In a milieu where these arguments and perceptions exist, it is not surprising that many Americans lack knowledge about the contemporary struggles of American Indian nations and that Abraham was able to perpetuate this strategic silence. Besides American Indians and their supporters, there is little evidence that other audiences have noticed the rhetorical exclusion. In a review of over 300 stories in the national news media on the site authorization decision, only one covered the Western Shoshone and Southern Paiute opposition to the site.81 Thus, strategic silence serves the interests of continuing a system of nuclear colonialism and avoiding discussion of American Indian sovereignty. It is in the government’s interest not only to perpetuate nuclear colonialism but also to keep it under wraps. However, as Robin Clair notes, ‘‘a trace of the marginalized and silenced other can be found in what is said or written. The negation, or silence, we are told, is never complete.’’82

#### And, nuclear accidents are dismissed as a necessary cost to the benefits of nuclear power. Prohibition of nuclear power production is a necessary radical shift that recognizes the value and grievability of those affected by the process.

**Benedict 11[[25]](#footnote-25)**

Scientists estimate that **1,000 people will die from cancer as a result of** their exposure to radiation from the **Fukushima** Daiichi disaster. **This number is often contrasted with the 20,000 who died** **in the** March 11 **earthquake** and tsunami that caused the nuclear debacle -- **presumably to suggest that the 1,000 deaths are less significant and should not be used to justify a nuclear power shutdown**. The Argonne National Laboratory's Hussein Khalil for one made just such a comparison in April, when he argued for the safety of US nuclear power, noting that the health consequences of the Fukushima plant thus far "pale in comparison" with the toll exacted by the natural disasters. In fact, **when faced with questions about** the safety of **nuclear power plants, experts often suggest that the public doesn't understand how to think about risk**; **if they did, the public would see that the rewards from nuclear energy** -- economic development, employment, reduced carbon emissions -- **outweigh the deaths** from the few accidents that have occurred, **particularly in comparison with other energy sources**. A 2007 study in the medical journal The Lancet, for example, found that deaths and illnesses attributed to the use of coal in energy production far outpace those caused by the use of nuclear energy. But why stop there? Some 30,000 people die in car crashes every year and yet Americans continue to drive -- now that is risky. Depending on the analogy, **one might be tempted to conclude that nuclear power carries no risk at all**. Apparently, the public is just very unsophisticated when it comes to comprehending risk. If so, at least we aren't alone. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when nearly 3,000 people died, the US government sacrificed 6,000-plus military personnel and many thousands more civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan and spent more than $1 trillion to ensure that such an attack never happens again. **One might wonder** just **how sophisticated government officials are when it comes to thinking about risk**. After all, the same logic should apply, right? The government should understand that the rewards of living in an open society are worth the risk of deaths and injury from an occasional terrorist attack -- whether in Oklahoma City or New York -- just as the economic and environmental rewards are worth the risk of death and injury associated with nuclear power. Whatever the thinking, rationale, or analogy, one thing is clear: **Terrorism is fought at any cost; but nuclear accidents are deflected**. The billions of dollars spent and lives sacrificed in pursuit of eradicating terrorism is an enormous price to pay in response to the deaths of 3,000. **So why won't the government pour** those kinds of financial and human **resources into** fixing safety problems at **nuclear power plants to ensure that another 1,000 people** or more **do not die** from radiation exposure in the wake of a future accident? How can we make sense of these different ways of thinking about death? **Radiation deaths from nuclear industry accidents quickly lead to talk of risks and rewards, costs and benefits.** But with deaths from political violence, the discussion immediately turns to justice and retribution -- no matter the toll. In the liberal democratic tradition, we learn that each individual life is unique, that each person's vote counts, that one death diminishes us all, and that the death by execution of even one innocent person is an outrage that cannot be tolerated in civilized society. **How then can we reconcile the nearly incalculable value of each individual life with a cost-benefit analysis that can sacrifice those lives for the benefits** of economic development, higher standards of living, and technological progress? **There seems to be a distinction between "political deaths" and "economic deaths."** Political deaths are repugnant because there is intention in the death -- an intention to kill out of hatred, malice, or dangerous ideological beliefs. Economic deaths are more **acceptable because there is no intention to kill**. **These sacrificed lives are part of the cost of doing business** -- the price of the technological advances that benefit the rest of us. The difference between political and economic death hinges on intention. Clearly, nuclear power companies do not intend to kill anyone, and they work hard to design, construct, and operate reactors as safely as possible. But far more needs to be done: **Facilities are outdated, unsecured, and the** US **government still doesn't have a safe solution for** spent-fuel **storage.** And -- **despite nuclear power's apparent safety compared with earthquakes**, coal-mining, and driving -- **the extreme danger of the radioactive material in power plants** and of nuclear technology in and of itself **is so well-known that the US government was prompted** (at the industry's urging) **to enact provisions that protect the nuclear industry from bearing the full burden** of such inherently risky nuclear operations. The Price-Anderson Act limits industry's liability in the case of accidents, and the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act charges the federal government with responsibility for permanently storing nuclear waste. Meanwhile, the other burdens of nuclear power -- cancer deaths from radiation exposure -- are borne not by the government, but by individuals and their families. And so we return to the question of how to understand and treat these deaths. Nuclear power companies do not intend to kill, but the outsized risks associated with nuclear power are plain to see. **Shouldn't we put as many resources into the prevention of these economic deaths as we do political ones?** **How do we reconcile our beliefs in an individual's right to safety and security with a public discussion that privileges economic gain from a dangerous technology over human lives?** Perhaps the problem should be cast in its starkest terms: What if Fukushima had been caused by terrorists? What if terrorists -- not natural disasters -- had cut off electrical power to the plant, causing meltdowns and radiation exposure that resulted in 1,000 deaths? **It's likely that governments would be doing everything within their power to ensure it never happened again. So, why not start now -- before the next Fukushima?**

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